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Previous research has demonstrated that targets who are directly affected by the 
outcomes of a situation focus on more detail in a situation than observers who see or 
overhear a situation but are not directly affected by the outcomes. However, behavioral 
responses of targets and observers suggest that their perceptions vary in other important 
ways. This research proposes and finds that individuals’ perceptions of the valence, that 
is the positivity or negativity, of a situation is affected by their role as a target or an 
observer. Specifically, observers have more negative perceptions than targets do. Such 
perceptions affect targets’ and observers’ cooperative behavior with initiators of a 
situation. To achieve cooperative behavior among observers, positive perceptions can be 
fostered through observers taking the perspective of the target, as targets often have more 
positive perceptions of the situation than do observers. Across five studies using different 
contexts, including bargaining games, organizational interactions, and feedback in a 
ballet course, some evidence is found to support the propositions. A discussion of the 
theoretical and practical implications of the empirical findings, as well as suggestions for 
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INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Shortly after his appointment, Microsoft CEO, Satya Nadella, spoke at a 
conference centered on women in technology. Although his comments about women in 
the technology industry were generally positive and supportive, one negative comment, 
suggesting that women should not ask for raises, quickly led to harsh criticism of 
Nadella. Much of this criticism, however, did not come from the conference’s target 
audience—professional women in technology—but rather from others outside the target 
audience (e.g., Dishman, 2014; Wingfield, 2014), who even suggested that Microsoft be 
boycotted by women in technology (Chowdhry, 2014). Yet, although Nadella’s 
comments were targeted directly at them, members of the target audience perceived such 
comments as attempts to pass along words of wisdom rather than to attack professional 
women, consistent with the theme of Nadella’s overall speech (Burrows, 2014; 
Chowdhry, 2014; Dishman, 2014). The attendees found Nadella’s comments to be 
valuable, and many of them hoped he would return to the conference in 2015, as he had 
committed to do before the conference began (Burrows, 2014).  
Had Nadella’s comments been only good or only bad, it is likely that both the 
target audience and outsiders would have had similar perceptions of the speech (Weiner, 
1985). But as the example of Microsoft’s CEO illustrates, situations are often ambivalent, 
or include both good aspects (e.g., Nadella’s supportive comments of women) and bad 
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aspects (e.g., Nadella’s comments discouraging women in the professional setting). 
Although in ambivalent situations individuals’ responses may be more likely to 
systematically vary, in all situations—good, bad, or ambivalent—situational factors may 
affect how a person perceives the situation, which leads to the question: what situational 
factors affect an individual’s perceptions of the valence of a situation? This question is 
important to address, as it helps explain why individuals’ perceptions of a situation 
systematically vary, and why individuals’ perceptions may be inconsistent across similar 
situations. Additionally, addressing this question demonstrates that situational roles affect 
perceptions of the valence of a situation, which affect individuals’ subsequent responses.  
In the current research, I argue that the temporary, informal role that a person 
holds in a situation as a target—an individual who participates in a situation and is 
directly affected by the actions initiated in the situation—or an observer—an individual 
who sees or overhears a situation but is not directly affected by the actions initiated in the 
situation—has a systematic effect on his or her perception of the situation, particularly in 
ambivalent situations. Specifically, I argue that observers perceive situations as more 
negative than targets do, as was the case in the perceptions that conference attendees 
(targets) and outside constituents (observers) had of the Microsoft CEO’s comments. I 
base my arguments on motivational theories, suggesting that because targets and 
observers have different motivations in a situation (Rozin & Royzmann, 2001), they 
develop different perceptions that vary in terms of valence.  
I further argue that individuals’ positive or negative perceptions affect their 
subsequent behaviors. Following the Microsoft speech, for example, many women at the 
conference offered support for Nadella and his vision for Microsoft (Chowdhry, 2014). In 
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contrast, many who were not the target of Nadella’s comments voiced their skepticism of 
the direction Nadella was taking Microsoft (Associated Press, 2014).  Supporting my 
argument, I draw upon previous research that has examined how targets and observers 
respond differently to purely good situations, or situations that only include good events, 
and purely bad situations, or situations that only include bad events (e.g., Ames & 
Kammrath, 2015; Boles, Croson, & Murninghan, 2000; Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-
Schneider, 1992; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Spencer & Rupp, 2009), reasoning that the 
patterns of behavior in such situations are amplified in ambivalent situations. Such 
research suggests that observers’ responses are more negative than targets’ responses. I 
focus on cooperation of targets and observers with the initiators of situations, as 
cooperative responses have implications for interpersonal relationships (Thompson, 
Wang, & Gunia, 2010) and organizational outcomes (Beersma et al., 2003; Ellis et al., 
2003; Varella, Javidan, & Waldman, 2012). 
As evidenced in the Microsoft example, negative perceptions of a situation, and 
subsequent negative responses toward a situation’s initiator (in this case the CEO of 
Microsoft) can harm interpersonal relationships in and among groups (e.g., Andersson & 
Pearson, 1999; Cohen-Charash, 2009), which can be harmful to individual satisfaction 
and reduce group performance and cohesion (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Kwan, Bond, 
& Singelis, 1997). Because of such consequences, an important question becomes how to 
attenuate the negative responses of observers. I argue that by attenuating observers’ 
negative perceptions, their negative responses will also be attenuated. To do so, I argue 
that by engaging in perspective taking (i.e., an individual’s understanding of another 
individual’s viewpoint; Davis, 1983; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & 
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Gollwitzer, 2011) of the target, an observer might better understand and adopt the 
perceptions of a target (Baston, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) 
and be more likely to have positive perceptions of a situation than if they do not engage 
in perspective taking.  
This dissertation proceeds as follows: I begin by reviewing research that examines 
how bad and good events affect targets’ and observers’ perceptions. Furthermore, I 
outline the motivations that appear to shape such perceptions. I argue that observers 
perceive situations more negatively than targets do, even when only good events occur. 
In contrast, targets are more likely than observers to perceive that a situation is positive. I 
then discuss targets’ and observers’ responses to situations, arguing that observers’ 
responses tend to be more negative than targets’ responses because of their varying 
perceptions. Finally, I argue that perspective taking is one way in which observers can be 
encouraged to have positive perceptions, which may encourage observers to have positive 
responses to a situation. These arguments are tested in five studies, followed by a 
discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, limitations of the 
studies, and avenues for future research.  
 
The Varying Perceptions of Targets and Observers 
Social psychology argues that a target’s experience in a situation is much different 
than an observer’s experience (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). A target 
experiences a situation first hand, while an observer only watches or hears about it, which 
results in each party having different perceptions of the situation (Ross, Lepper, & 
Hubbard, 1975). For example, targets tend to recognize more detail in a situation than 
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observers do (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Vazire, 2010).  
In addition to the amount of detail an individual recognizes in a situation, there 
may be other ways in which targets’ and observers’ perceptions vary, including the 
valence of their perceptions, or the extent to which the situation is perceived as positive, 
negative, or ambivalent (a combination of both positive and negative). Situations can be 
good, bad, or ambivalent. Yet, how a person perceives a situation ultimately defines the 
valence of the situation for that particular person. This means that a person’s perceptions 
of the situation’s valence may be different from the actual valence of the situation. In 
purely good or bad situations individuals can easily recognize the situation’s valence 
(Weiner, 1985), which may result in targets and observers having more similar 
perceptions than in ambivalent situations in which the valence of the situation is not 
clear. Thus, compared with purely good or purely bad situations, in ambivalent situations 
individuals’ perceptions of the valence may be more strongly affected by other factors 
such as a person’s role.  
Individuals can conceptualize good and bad as independent factors or endpoints 
on a single continuum, resulting in individuals recognizing a situation as purely good, 
purely bad, both good and bad (i.e., ambivalent), or neither good nor bad (Cacioppo & 
Berntson, 1994; Taylor, 1991). While there is general agreement that individuals focus 
more on bad than good events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), 
there is disagreement regarding when individuals also attend to good events (see 
Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmann, 2001). Greater attention to good events 
seems to rest on the individual’s salient motivations in the situation (Rozin & Royzmann, 
2001). Indeed, individuals’ salient motivations in the moment help them determine what 
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information is important in the situation (Kunda, 1990). Situational factors can 
systematically affect the salience of different motivations (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 
1999). When involved the same situation, however, one factor that may differentially 
affect the salience of individuals’ motivations is their roles as targets or observers.  
Targets’ and observers’ motivations systematically vary in salience (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1972). Two motivations that commonly affect individuals and that appear to vary 
across targets and observers are the motivations to preserve a positive self-concept and to 
be included in socially desirable groups. Such motivations seem to be more salient to 
targets than to observers because targets’ experiences in the situation directly help or 
hinder the fulfillment of their motivations. Next, I outline each motivation and explain 
how its salience to targets and observers may uniquely affect their perceptions of the 
valence of a situation.  
 
Motivations Related to the Self-Concept 
Individuals are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Taylor, 1983; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988). When one’s self-concept becomes threatened, the motivation to 
maintain a positive self-concept becomes highly salient, resulting in individuals 
attempting to find ways in which to reinforce their positive self-concept (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1993). Such a threat may occur when individuals have little to no 
control over a situation, as they cannot ensure that the outcomes of the situation will have 
a positive, or at least not a negative, effect on their self-concept. To the extent that both 
targets and observers do not have control in a situation, because targets in the situation 
are directly affected by the situation’s outcomes, this lack of control will be more 
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threatening to their self-concept than to those who are observers of the situation because 
observers are not directly affected by the situation’s outcomes.  
One way targets protect their self-concept is by adopting positive perceptions of 
the situation (Gilbert, 1998), which allow them to maintain a positive self-concept despite 
what occurs in a situation (Gilbert, 1998; Greenwald, 1980, 1981; Rutte & Messick, 
1995; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Taylor, 1991; Taylor & Brown, 1988; van den Bos, Bruins, 
Wilke, & Dronkert, 1999). For example, one way individuals maintain a positive self-
concept following economic transactions is by seeking out the favorable aspects of their 
own outcomes, including any actual or relative gains (Adams, 1965; Gardner, van Dyne, 
& Pierce, 2004; Miller, 1999; Twenge & Campbell, 2002). Targets also make favorable 
comparisons (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985), 
ignore bad events (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Moreland & Sweeny, 1984), and attribute 
positive outcomes to their own abilities rather than situational factors (Baumeister, 1998; 
Jones & Nisbett, 1972) to help them to maintain a positive self-concept.  
Because the outcomes of the situation do not directly affect observers, they have 
little motivation to perceive the situation positively. As such, observers are more likely 
than targets to ignore good events and recognize bad events, as bad events more easily 
attract a person’s attention and have a stronger influence on shaping one’s perceptions of 
a situation compared with good events (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001). Furthermore, because people use bad events to understand the general meaning of 
the situation (Gilovich, 1983), observers, as outsiders to the situation, may be more likely 




Motivations Related to Group Inclusion 
Individuals are not only concerned with how they perceive themselves, but also 
how they are perceived in the eyes of others (Swann & Bosson, 2010). Thus, individuals 
are motivated to present a positive image to both themselves and desirable social groups 
(Schlenker, 1980). Because a person’s image in the eyes of others is often shaped by the 
attitudes and behaviors he or she adopts when interacting with members of the desirable 
group, situations in which a person has direct interaction with the group will make his or 
her motivations to be accepted by, or at least not excluded from, the group more salient 
(e.g., Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009). When the initiator of a situation 
is a member of a desirable group, it is likely that the motivation to be accepted by a 
situation’s initiator and his or her group is more salient for the target than for observers.  
As a consequence of salient social motivations, targets may attempt to display 
attitudes that conform with the group’s attitudes (Williams, 2007; Williams, Shore, & 
Grahe, 1998), which often include perceiving the actions of group members as positive 
(Crocker & Canevello, 2008; Lakey & Cassady, 1990). Indeed, when people want 
support from or affiliation with a group, they are more likely to perceive their interactions 
with group members as positive (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Lakey & Cassady, 1990; 
Uhl-Bien, Graen, & Scandura, 2000). Such a pattern can be found in followers’ 
perceptions of their interactions with leaders. Followers see leaders as desirable 
associates and often need their support for personal success; consequently, followers tend 
to perceive their interactions with a leader as more positive than they would had the 
interaction not been initiated by a leader (Meindl, 1991; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). 
Likewise, when individuals strive to gain favorable economic outcomes, they often 
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perceive the situation positively (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Kopelman, Rosette, & 
Thompson, 2006), which helps to promote positive social exchange with those involved 
in the interaction (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006) and often results in the desired 
economic outcomes. Thus, through their heightened motivation to be perceived positively 
by a desirable social entity, targets are likely to perceive the actions of the group or its 
members as more positive than negative.  
In contrast to targets, observers are not as worried that their attitudes and 
behaviors will result in exclusion from the group because they, as observers, are not 
directly involved in the situation and often go unnoticed by group members (Fischer et 
al., 2011). Without such concerns, social motivations are less salient for observers than 
targets, which may result in observers not feeling the same motivation as targets to adopt 
positive perceptions of the situation. The valence of observers’ perceptions may instead 
be shaped by their tendency to recognize the bad events of the situation (Baumeister et 
al., 2001). And because as outsiders, observers often feel a responsibility to uphold social 
norms (Sober & Wilson, 1997), they are apt to recognize norm violations, which signal to 
them that something is wrong in the situation (O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011). These negative 
signals enhance an observer’s cognitive processing of that particular event in the situation 
(Elsbach & Barr, 1999), resulting in such events having a greater influence in shaping the 
observer’s overall perception of the situation compared with other events in the situation 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Together, these factors result in observers perceiving the 






 The motivational explanations outlined above suggest that information about 
someone’s role as a target or observer in a situation may help inform our understanding 
regarding the extent to which people perceive a situation as positive or negative. This is 
not to contest previous research that has demonstrated that all individuals recognize bad 
events in a situation (Baumeister et al., 2001). Rather, the varying salience of targets’ and 
observers’ motivations presented above suggest that although all individuals may focus 
on bad events, targets are more likely than observers to also attend to good events. 
Consistent with the above arguments, I propose the following:  
Proposition 1: Observers perceive situations as more negative than do targets.  
 
Targets’ and Observers’ Behavioral Responses as a 
Result of their Perceptions 
Individuals’ perceptions have been previously linked to their subsequent behavior 
(Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). This linkage occurs because a person uses his or her 
perceptions to determine the appropriate response in a situation (March, 1995; Messick, 
1999). If individuals’ situational roles as targets or observers affect their perceptions, and 
perceptions affect subsequent behavior, then a person’s role as a target or an observer 
may affect the valence of his or her responses in a situation. If individuals’ roles are 
affecting their perceptions through the self and social motivations that are salient to them 
in a given situation, and these perceptions in turn are affecting subsequent behaviors, 
individuals’ responses will likely follow the same pattern outlined in Proposition 1. 
Furthermore, because those involved in the situation are given the most attention in the 
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situation, both targets and observers will likely see the situation’s initiator as at least 
partially responsible for the outcomes and direct their responses toward the initiator. 
Observers’ unique perceptions may also result in them directing their responses toward 
the targets of the situation. Additionally, because in many cases individuals perceive the 
initiator’s actions as influenced by his or her group, both targets and observers may also 
direct their responses toward the initiator’s group. These responses occur in good, bad, 
and ambivalent situations, but most research has focused on purely good or bad 
situations. People have similar patterns of behavior in purely good and bad situations, 
but, as with perceptions, such patterns may be exacerbated in ambivalent situations.  
 
Targets’ and Observers’ Responses to Good Situations 
 In purely good situations targets’ and observers’ responses differ. Targets 
generally have positive responses to good situations, as being the beneficiary of another 
person’s actions often makes them feel good about themselves and signals that they are in 
good standing with the initiator and his or her group (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, 1998; 
Rocklage & Fazio, 2014; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996). In contrast, because good 
events usually do not directly benefit observers, and often cannot gain the attention of 
individuals in the same way that bad events can (Baumeister et al., 2001), observers tend 
to ignore the interactions they see in good situations. If observers do recognize such 
interactions, however, they often perceive the situation as less positive for themselves 
compared with the beneficiary (Ames & Kammrath, 2015), which appears to result in 
negative responses. Below, I address the valence of targets’ and observers’ responses to 
the initiator of the situation and the initiator’s group, as well as observers’ responses to 
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targets, in good situations.  
 Responses toward the person initiating the situation. Targets enjoy being the 
beneficiary of others’ good behavior and often reciprocate such behavior (Bono, Glomb, 
Shen, Kim, & Koch, 2013; Wang, Galinsky, & Murninghan, 2009). Targets are more 
trusting and generous toward an initiator who is helpful (Kette, 1986), or promises to be 
helpful (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008), than an initiator who is not. Targets also 
engage in forgiveness (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Tomlinson, Dineen, & 
Lewicki, 2004) and trust (e.g., Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006) and have a 
positive impression of those who engage in positive actions (e.g., Bottom, Gibson, 
Daniels, & Murninghan, 2002; Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001; Shapiro, 1991). 
Observers, because they are not the beneficiaries of such behavior, do not feel the same 
need to reciprocate the positive behavior they see between other parties. Indeed, 
observers tend to discount the actions of those who initiate positive action toward others 
beside themselves (Ames & Kammrath, 2015; O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011), which in some 
cases results in negative responses toward the initiator, including withdrawal behaviors or 
attempts to punish the initiator (e.g., Duffy & Shaw, 2000; Vecchio, 2000). 
Responses toward the group. Group settings feature many interactions that can 
be observed by others. In some cases, individuals may hold both the situation’s initiator 
and the group itself responsible for the outcomes they experience or observe (Hewstone, 
1990). Thus, targets and observers may respond toward the larger group within which 
they are interacting (e.g., Grant & Gino, 2010), such as the organization (e.g., Brief, 
Butcher, & Roberson, 1995) in addition to any single individual involved in the situation. 
When targets feel that they are recipients of positive behavior, they often engage in 
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subsequent positive behaviors toward the situation’s initiator and the initiator’s group. 
For example, after a positive interaction with their manager, targets are more willing to 
initiate organizationally functional change (Morrison & Phelps, 1999) and engage in 
organizational citizenship behaviors toward coworkers (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; Yaffe & Kark, 2011). Observers also see groups as 
responsible for initiating positive actions toward targets. However, observers tend to have 
a difficult time understanding why the group would not also give them a similar outcome 
as the target, which often results in observers minimizing the positive events that others 
experience (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004) or punishing the group as well as the individual 
who initiated the situation (Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, 2008). Together this suggests 
that observers respond more negatively toward the group than targets do.  
Observers’ responses toward the target. Observers additionally appear to have 
negative responses toward the targets of good situations (Vecchio, 2000). In some cases, 
when observers recognize others experiencing positive treatment, they attempt to 
discount such treatment by engaging in negative responses toward the target of the 
positive actions. Such behavior may include social undermining (Duffy, Scott, Shaw, 
Tepper, & Aquino, 2012), attempts to eliminate the target’s advantageous position (Smith 
& Kim, 2007), or harmful behavior toward the target (Cohen-Charash, 2009). Together, 
this work supports the idea that negative responses toward the target often follow an 






Targets’ and Observers’ Responses to Bad Situations 
 
In bad situations, observers’ responses tend to be at least as negative as targets’ 
responses. All individuals respond more extremely to negative situations compared with 
positive situations (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) and subsequently 
engage in similar negative behaviors (Darley & Latané, 1968; Greenbaum, Mawritz, 
Mayer, & Priesemuth, 2013; Sanfey, 2007). Like good situations, targets’ and observers’ 
responses to bad situations are directed toward the situation’s initiator and his or her 
group; observers’ responses additionally can be directed toward the targets of a situation. 
Responses toward the person initiating the situation. When targets have 
negative responses to bad situations, they often direct such responses toward the initiator 
of the situation rather than others involved in the situation (Trafimow, Bromgard, Finlay, 
& Ketelaar, 2005). For example, employees who have an abusive supervisor often 
retaliate directly against their supervisor (Bowling & Michel, 2011; Neuman & Baron, 
1998; Tepper et al., 2009). Likewise, when a person is the target of coworker violence, he 
or she is willing to respond toward the coworker through negative and aggressive 
behavior (Andersson & Pearson, 1999).  
In ultimatum bargaining games (UBGs)—a one-shot allocation involving an 
allocator, a recipient, and a sum of money to divide (Croson, Boles, & Murninghan, 
2003)—both targets and observers respond to the decisions of an allocator who initiates a 
negative situation when given the opportunity. Target recipients who perceive that they 
received a bad offer punish the allocator by rejecting the offer (Boles et al., 2000; Falk & 
Fischbacher, 2006; Koning, van Dijk, van Beest, & Steinel, 2010), even when rejecting 
the offer means losing any gains from the offer (Croson et al., 2003; Güth & Tietz, 1990; 
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Sanfey, 2007; Straub & Murninghan, 1995). Observers also punish allocators who make 
low offers to targets, even when they are not directly affected by the bad event, it is 
costly to their own outcome, or the targets are not themselves willing to punish the 
allocator (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Turillo, 
Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). One reason that observers appear to be more 
determined than targets to punish others is because they perceive such bad events as norm 
violations (O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011), making them quick to judge (Skitka, 2002) and 
punish such violators when possible (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Spencer & Rupp, 
2009).  
Responses toward the group. Targets also have negative responses toward the 
group associated with the initiator when they experience bad situations. Employees 
engage in counterproductive behaviors (e.g., Brockner et al., 2007; Skarlicki & Folger, 
1997), low performance (Riketta, 2008), and fewer extra role behaviors (e.g., Fassina, 
Jones, Uggerslev, 2008) when they feel that they have been treated badly by a 
representative of an organization. Likewise, observers tend to engage in negative 
responses toward the group (Folger, 2001; Greenbaum et al., 2013; O’Reilly & Aquino, 
2011). For example, individuals who survived their department’s layoffs consequently 
decreased their commitment to the organization (Brockner et al., 1992). Although both 
targets and observers engage in such negative behavior, targets tend to respond positively 
more often than observers do, or at least choose not to respond negatively, toward the 
larger group in which the bad situation occurred (Glomb, Bhave, Miner, & Wall, 2011; 
Hoobler & Brass, 2006; Tepper et al., 2009). Thus in bad situations, targets’ responses 
toward the group may not be as consistently negative as observers’ responses.  
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Observers’ responses toward the target. According to attribution theory, 
observers attribute bad events to the behaviors of both the initiators and the targets of the 
situation (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). As a consequence, observers may punish a target, even 
in a bad situation in which the target is the victim (Jones & Harris, 1967; Lerner, 1980; 
Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Consistent with such views, Diekmann, Sillito-Walker, 
Galinsky, and Tenbrunsel (2013) found that individuals punished victims of sexual 
harassment by being unwilling to work with the victims and not recommending them for 
other jobs. Thus, it seems that observers’ negative responses can extend even to those 
who may not be responsible for the outcomes of the situation, but are worse off because 
of such outcomes.  
 
Summary 
Together, the research on good and bad situations reviewed above suggests that 
similar to the pattern suggested between the valence of targets’ and observers’ 
perceptions, observers’ responses to a situation are more negative than targets’ responses. 
Indeed, targets’ responses are generally positive in good situations, while observers’ 
responses tend to be less positive, and in some cases negative. And while both targets and 
observers seem to have negative responses to bad situations, observers respond to the 
situation when targets do not, suggesting that observers have more consistently negative 
responses than do targets. Given these patterns of behavior, I propose the following:  
Proposition 2: Observers’ responses are more negative than targets’ responses to 
a situation.   
As outlined in Propositions 1 and 2, observers tend to be more negative than 
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targets in their perceptions of a situation and subsequent responses. As suggested above, 
this may be because an individual’s perceptions of a situation often drive his or her 
responses to the situation (Petty et al., 1995). Indeed, such perceptions lead an individual 
to respond in ways that he or she considers appropriate (March, 1995; Messick, 1999). 
Thus, building on Propositions 1 and 2, and consistent with previous research, I propose: 
Proposition 3: Perceptions of valence of a situation mediate the relationship 
between an individual’s role as a target or an observer and the valence of his or 
her response to the situation.  
 
Reducing Negative Perceptions of Observers through 
Perspective Taking 
 If observers focus more on bad, and less on good, events in the situation 
compared with targets, and individuals observe more situations than they actually 
experience (Bandura, 1977; Cugueró-Escofet, Fortin, & Canela, 2013), individuals will 
respond negatively to situations more often than they will respond positively. As argued 
above, this can in some cases adversely affect the parties involved. Having a negative 
response can eliminate opportunities to develop a new relationship (Clark & Reis, 1988), 
be more productive (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), or coordinate with others (Okhuysen & 
Bechky, 2009).1 Such missed opportunities may reduce performance (Riketta 2008) and 
increase counterproductive behaviors (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). Assuming that 
an individual’s perceptions of the valence of a situation result in a similarly valenced 
                                                
 
1 This is not to say that a lack of cooperation is always negative; research on creativity (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010) and decision making (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001) show that a lack of cooperation 
can, in some cases, be productive for the organization.  
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response, and that observers’ perceptions are more negative than targets’ perceptions, 
when individuals or groups want to encourage cooperation an important question 
becomes, how can an observer’s negative perceptions of the situation be reduced?  
 Taking the perspective of the target, who perceives the situation as more positive 
than observers do, may be one way to encourage positive perceptions in observers. 
Perspective taking allows observers to understand the point of view of the target, which 
helps them to align their attributions with those of the target (Regan & Totten, 1975). For 
example, when observers take the perspective of a person involved in a situation, they 
make fewer dispositional attributions compared with observers who simply observe the 
interaction (Storms, 1973).    
Yet perspective taking does not only change the attributions individuals make; it 
also allows individuals to feel closer to those whose perspectives they have adopted 
(Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky et al., 2005) and better understand 
others’ thought processes (Davis, 1983). Thus perspective taking may help perspective 
takers adopt the motivations, and not just attributions, of those whose perspective they 
take. Because targets’ self and social motivations arguably encourage their positive 
perceptions, if observers take a target’s perspective of the situation, their negative 
perceptions may be attenuated because they better understand the target’s motivations. As 
a consequence, observers’ responses toward the initiator and target of the situation, as 
well as the initiator’s group after perspective taking, may be more positive than without 
perspective taking.  
Taking the perspective of a target has been shown to reduce observers’ negative 
perceptions in many situations. Take, for example, the research on stereotyping and 
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perspective taking. Members of groups that are negatively stereotyped tend to dismiss the 
stereotypes directed toward their group and instead focus on positive aspects of the 
group, which allows a positive perception of group membership (Crocker & Major, 
1989). When individuals outside the stereotyped group (i.e., observers) take the 
perspective of stereotyped group members, they are likely to adopt a perception of the 
group that is similar to group members’ perceptions (Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000), which tends to be more positive than the outside individual’s original 
perception (Wang, Ku, Tai, & Galinsky, 2013). Another example of this pattern can be 
observed in the sexual harassment literature. Victims of sexual harassment often do 
nothing when they have been harassed (Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, 1995), as they 
perceive the harassment as a result of situational factors, which allows them to maintain a 
positive self-concept (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010). Observers of such harassment often 
have negative perceptions of the victim, as they perceive them as partially responsible for 
the harassment (Smirles, 2004). However, when observers take the perspective of the 
sexual harassment victim and consider the motivations likely salient to the victim, their 
negative perceptions of the victim are reduced (Diekmann et al., 2013). Finally, the 
relationship between suppliers and customers demonstrates a similar pattern. Suppliers 
often have a difficult time convincing their customers that a late shipment was not their 
fault. However, Parker and Axtell (2001) found that customers recognized suppliers’ 
situational constraints more often and had a better relationship with the suppliers when 
the customers engaged in perspective taking. The common pattern in the examples 
outlined above suggests that when observers have negative perceptions of a situation, 




Together, these arguments suggest that targets have a more positive perception of 
a situation than observers. Observers may be able to adopt more positive perceptions by 
taking the perspective of the target in the situation, as research on perspective taking has 
shown that perspective takers identify more with, and understand the motivations of, 
those whose perspectives they adopt (Davis et al., 1996). Consistent with these 
arguments, I propose the following:  
Proposition 4: Observers who take a target’s perspective have a more positive 
perception of the situation than observers who do not take a target’s perspective. 
 
Varying Perceptions in Ambivalent Situations and 
Individuals’ Cooperative Responses 
Above, I outlined a variety of ways that individuals might respond in a given 
situation: Individuals may respond toward the person initiating the situation or toward the 
group to which those involved in the situation belong. Additionally, observers may direct 
their responses toward the targets of the situation. While responses may be directed 
toward each of these parties, in this research I focus on how individuals respond toward 
those who initiate a situation. More specifically, I focus on individuals’ cooperative 
responses towards those who initiate a situation.  
Cooperation affects many outcomes including performance (e.g., Beersma et al., 
2003; Beersma et al., 2009), interpersonal relationships (e.g., Bazerman, Curhan, & 
Moore, 2000; De Dreu, 2010; Thompson et al., 2010), and individual satisfaction (Smith, 
Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). Yet, cooperation can be difficult to maintain when bad events 
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occur, as individuals can lose the motivation to cooperate with others (Boles et al., 2000; 
Brockner et al., 2007; Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, & Marinova, 2012). Once bad 
events have occurred, it can be difficult for some individuals to cooperate with those who 
initiated the bad event. For example, when an individual is deceived, he or she is hesitant 
to work with the deceiver again, even when the deceiver apologizes or behaves positively 
toward the individual (Schweitzer et al., 2006).   
Previous research demonstrates that a person’s perceptions affect his or her 
willingness to cooperate (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Heilman & Chen, 2005; Kidder & McLean-Parks, 2001; Kortenkamp & Moore, 
2006). This research suggests that perceptions of a situation’s valence—positive, 
negative, or ambivalent—should affect subsequent cooperative behavior. Examples 
linking perceptions to cooperative behavior abound in the literature. The name of a game, 
for example, affects players’ perceptions of the competitiveness of the game and how 
cooperatively they behave toward the other players (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; 
Pillutla & Chen, 1999). Likewise, goal compatibility and reward structures affect 
perceptions and subsequent cooperation (Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002; 
Thompson & Deharpport, 1998). Individual differences can also affect variation in 
perceptions of the situation, and subsequently, cooperative behavior. Social value 
orientation, for example, affects how negotiators perceive the negotiation, leading some 
negotiators to engage in cooperative behaviors more than others (Bogaert, Boone, & 
Declerck, 2008; Van Lange, 1999). Examining cooperation as an outcome of an 
individuals’ role in the situation may address the calls made by previous research to 
better understand why individuals’ cooperation varies across situations or across 
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individuals within the same situation (Komoita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Van Lange & 
Semin-Goossens, 1998). Moreover, examining how an individual’s role affects his or her 
perception of the situation’s valence may offer insight into why situational roles affect 
subsequent cooperative behavior.  
In Chapter 2, I outline a series of studies that I conducted to understand how an 
individual’s role in the situation affects his or her perception of the situation and 
subsequent cooperative behavior. The studies aim to create several ambivalent situations, 
thus assessing how perceptions systematically vary by situational role and affect 
subsequent cooperative behavior. Next, I develop specific hypotheses related to targets’ 
and observers’ perceptions and cooperative behavior toward the initiator of the situation 
that follow the propositions made previously. Through these studies, a better 
understanding is gained of how targets’ and observers’ perceptions differ and why 


















To examine the propositions from Chapter 1, I create a variety of ambivalent 
situations that may include targets and observers. Specifically, I develop four sets of 
hypotheses across five studies related to how targets’ and observers’ perceptions vary 
based on what they focus on, and how such perceptions affect cooperative responses 
toward the initiator of the situation. Studies 1–3 experimentally assess the core 
hypotheses related to targets’ and observers’ perceptions and their cooperative behavior. 
Study 4 assesses the core hypotheses by examining ballet dancers’ cooperative behavior 
in response to performance feedback. Study 5 experimentally assesses the role of 
perspective taking in attenuating observers’ negative perceptions of a situation.  
Study 1 examined the main effect of people’s roles as targets or observers on their 
perceptions of the situation in terms of the extent to which they focused on good and bad 
events in the situation. Specifically, Study 1 asked participants to recall a situation at 
work, manipulating whether they were asked to recall the situation as a target or an 
observer. Two raters assessed responses to determine the extent to which individuals 
discussed positive or negative aspects of the situation. Study 2 assessed individuals’ 
willingness to cooperate by having participants play several rounds of a dictator game 
with real payouts that were seen as either good or bad. Participants were first assigned to 
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be the target or the observer in the game, but then were asked to be the allocator, making 
an allocation to the person who was previously the allocator. Thus participants made an 
allocation to the person responsible for the outcomes in the first four rounds of the game.  
Studies 3 and 4 assessed how the extent to which individuals focus on good and 
bad events in a situation (i.e., their perceptions of the valence of a situation) mediated the 
relationship between a person’s role as a target or an observer and cooperative behavior 
toward the initiator of the situation. In Study 3, participants engaged in a hypothetical 
version of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) and then reported the extent 
to which they focused on good and bad events in the situation and their willingness to 
cooperate with the initiator of the outcomes in the situation. Study 4 assessed the same 
relationship though a field study, focusing on the performance feedback that students 
from the University of Utah’s Ballet Department received in their technique class. Over a 
period of six classes, participants were assigned to the role of target or observer and 
reported the valence of the performance feedback on which they focused during class and 
their subsequent willingness to cooperate with the class instructor.  
Finally, Study 5 used an experiment to assess the extent to which perspective 
taking encouraged observers to focus more on good events, and less on bad events, in the 
situation. Once again the dictator game was used to create an ambivalent context. Targets 
and observers reported the extent to which they focused on the good and bad events. 
Together, these five studies offer new insight into the effect that a situational role—as 





Study 1: Targets’ and Observers’ Focus on 
Good and Bad Events 
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the varying perceptions of targets and 
observers. Targets and observers have different perceptions of a given situation (Ross & 
Nisbett, 1991), which may include variations in perceptions of the situation’s valence. An 
individual’s perceptions are shaped by what he or she focuses on in the situation (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979). Thus, I operationalized perceptions by assessing the extent to which 
individuals focus on good and bad events in a given situation. As discussed when 
developing Proposition 1, observers’ negative perceptions are shaped by their focus on 
the bad events in a situation. And while targets’ perceptions are also shaped by bad 
events, their attention to good events makes their perceptions less negative than 
observers’ perceptions.  Consistent with this idea, and Proposition 1, I hypothesize the 
following:   
Hypothesis 1a: Observers focus on bad events in a situation more than targets do. 
Hypothesis 1b: Observers focus on good events in a situation less than targets do. 
 
Method 
 Participants. Based on an a priori power analysis expecting a small to moderate 
effect size, 130 participants (65 women) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(M-Turk). Participants were paid $1.00. M-Turk is a virtual marketplace in which 
individuals who need tasks requiring human intelligence completed can find participants. 
The use of M-Turk is growing; top journals in psychology and management are 
increasingly accepting M-Turk studies as viable empirical evidence (e.g., Adam & 
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Shirako, 2013; Chua, 2013; Gere, MacDonald, Joel, Spielmann, & Impett, 2013). 
Participants from M-Turk have been shown to produce data that have similar reliabilities 
as more traditional university samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Sprouse, 
2011). Furthermore, M-Turk offers researchers the ability to target a broad sample of 
individuals or a very specific population. Given that I was interested in how individuals 
perceived situations at work, I used M-Turk to target participants who were currently 
employed in a variety of industries and with a range of experience. On average, 
participants were 37 years old and had 12.5 years full-time work experience in industries 
such as sales and customer service, finance, accounting, marketing, IT, and operations. 
Seventy-eight percent of participants identified as White, 11% as African American, 4% 
as Asian, 5% as Hispanic, and 2% as other.  
 Design and procedure. In Study 1, I manipulated target versus observer to assess 
how targets and observers perceive the situations that they experience. I chose to use a 
recall task as it can assess what people are thinking (e.g., Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; 
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Tamir, 2005). After giving consent to participate, 
participants were randomly assigned to the role of target or observer. Specifically, 
participants were asked to read and respond to a prompt, which asked them to recall a 
situation in which they experienced (or observed) an interaction at work. Targets 
(observers) read the following:  
Please recall an incident in which you experienced (observed) an interaction at 
work between you and another person (two individuals) in which the other (one) 
person’s actions affected you (the other person). By experienced (observed), we 
mean that you were (were not) directly affected by the person initiating the 
situation; the other person’s actions directly affected (did not affect) you.  
 
After reading this prompt, participants wrote about the experience they recalled, 
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answered several demographic questions2, and were given a code to complete the survey 
and receive their payment for participation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Two coders, blind to the hypotheses and participants’ conditions, coded 
participants’ responses by indicating their agreement with four statements (i.e., the 
participant recalled bad events, the participant recalled good events, the situation 
described was bad, the situation described was good) on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale. Coders could rate a statement from a participant as high on both 
good and bad events, which allowed coders’ ratings of the extent to which participants 
focused on good and bad events to be orthogonal, as such constructs have previously 
been argued to be orthogonal (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). Coders rated one-third of the 
responses, reconciled any disagreements, and coded the remaining responses. Agreement 
between coders was sufficient; the ratings for both negative focus, r(130) = .75, p < .001, 
and positive focus, r(130) = .74, p < .001, were high. I created two scales using the 
coders’ ratings: the questions asking about participants’ recollection and description of 
bad events created a negative focus scale (α = .86), and the questions about participants’ 
recollection and descriptions of good events created a positive focus scale (α = .85).  
I conducted two separate one-way ANOVAs to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b with a 
person’s role as a target or an observer as the independent variable and the composite 
                                                
 
2 Demographic questions, including race, gender, age, work experience, education, and current 
employment, were included in every study in this research to assess the nature of the sample completing the 
study, and in turn, the generalizability of the studies’ outcomes. No formal hypotheses related to these 
demographic questions were made in any of the studies.  
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rating for negative or positive focus as the dependent variable. Offering partial support 
for Hypothesis 1a, there was a small difference between targets (M = 4.71, SD = 1.10) 
and observers (M = 5.01, SD = .82) in the extent to which they focused on bad events in 
the situation, F(1, 130) = 3.04, p = .084, η2 = .02; observers tended to focus more on bad 
events in a situation compared with targets. Supporting Hypothesis 1b, targets (M = 4.21, 
SD = 1.43) focused more on good events in the situation than observers (M = 3.63, SD = 
1.66), F(1,130) = 4.58, p = .034, η2 = .04. These results demonstrate that, as predicted, 
observers focus less on good events in a situation compared with targets (see Figure 1).  
Overall, the results from Study 1 support Proposition 1 by suggesting that 
observers’ perceptions of the situation are more negative and less positive than targets’ 
 
 
Figure 1: Extent to which participants focused on good and bad events in the situation 
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perceptions of the situation’s valence was primarily due to the differences between their 
focus on good events in the situation. The weaker support for Hypothesis 1a suggests that 
both targets and observers focus to some extent on bad events in the situation. This is not 
surprising, given that individuals in most situations tend to be biased toward bad events 
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmann, 2001). The pattern of results from 
Study 1 suggests that the differences between positive and negative perceptions of the 
overall situation may be driven more by the extent to which individuals focus on the good 
events than by the extent to which they focus on the bad events in the situation.  
 
Study 2: Cooperation in Response to Positive and 
Negative Allocations 
Study 1 demonstrated that observers’ perceptions of a situation are more negative 
and less positive than targets’ perceptions. Individuals’ actions tend to be consistent with 
their perceptions of the situation, as such perceptions affect what behaviors individuals 
perceive as appropriate (March, 1995; Messick, 1999). Building on Proposition 1, which 
focused on perceptions, Proposition 2 suggested that observers respond more negatively 
than targets respond in a situation. Thus, it seems likely that an observer, compared with 
a target, has more negative, and less positive, responses toward the person initiating the 
situation. As stated previously, because of the implications that cooperation has for the 
organization (Beersma et al., 2003) and for individual satisfaction (Smith et al., 1995), I 
examined cooperative behavior as a response in this research. Based on the pattern 
proposed in Proposition 2, observers, relative to targets, engage in less cooperative 
behavior toward the individual initiating the situation. Consistent with this logic and 
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Proposition 2, I suggest the following:  
Hypothesis 2: Observers cooperate less with the initiator of a situation than 
targets do.  
Allocation exercises such as ultimatum bargaining games (UBGs) and dictator 
games have been used in previous research examining cooperative behavior. Such games 
have been manipulated to create bad situations by allocating targets (i.e., allocation 
recipients) almost nothing or good situations by giving targets a generous allocation 
(Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). Studies 2, 3, and 5 modified this approach to create 
an ambivalent situation by using repeated allocation games in which several rounds of 
good and bad allocations were made.  
 
 Method 
 Participants. Based on the results of an a priori power analysis anticipating a 
small effect size, I collected data from 350 participants (168 women). These participants 
were recruited from M-Turk in exchange for payment of up to $1.75. Participants 
received $0.25 for participating in the study and up to $1.50 as a bonus depending on the 
decisions they made during the game. On average, participants were 35 years old. 
Seventy-five percent of participants identified themselves as White, 8% as African-
American, 9% as Asian, 5% as Hispanic, and 3% as “other.” Although employment was 
not a requirement in this study, 73% of participants were employed.  
 Design and procedure. Study 2 was designed to examine the effect of a person’s 
role as a target or observer on their cooperative behavior. Study 2 had two conditions, 
target or observer, and examined both actual cooperative behavior and self-reports of 
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individuals’ willingness to cooperate. After giving consent to participate in this study, 
participants learned that they would be playing a dictator game. The dictator game is a 
form of a UBG in which the target (i.e., allocation recipient) does not have the ability to 
accept or reject the offer made to him or her by the allocator. The dictator game used in 
this study had three roles: an allocator, who was assigned to allocate a sum of money 
between themself and a target; a target, who received a portion of the sum of money that 
the allocator gave to them but had no say in how much money they received and could 
not accept or reject the offer made; and an observer, a person who witnessed the game 
but did not gain anything from the allocation. Participants were described the roles of 
allocator, target, and observer and told that they would be assigned one of these roles. 
Participants were also informed that the other two roles in the game would be assigned to 
the other two members of their group—an experimenter and another participant—and 
that this group would stay intact for the duration of the study. Participants learned that 
one allocation made by the allocator was considered one round of the game, and after 
each round, participants may be reassigned to a new role. For the first four rounds, the 
role of the allocator was always played by the experimenter, who had predetermined 
decisions that were made across the four rounds of the game. The two participants were 
randomly assigned to play the role of target or observer in the first four rounds. 
Participants were informed that they would receive the money from one round of the 
game that they actually played (rather than observed).3 Paying participants a fraction of 
the money they earn in a UBG has been successful at eliciting real decisions from 
                                                
 
3 All participants received the money from the last game, as all participants were assigned to be the 
allocator and chose how much of the available money (e.g., $1.50) they wanted to keep for themselves.	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participants in previous studies (e.g., Turillo et al., 2002).  
Targets were told that they would receive an offer from the allocator in each 
round of the game. Observers were told that they would be observing games between an 
allocator and a target. After receiving their roles, all participants read the instructions for 
the dictator game (see Appendix A). Participants then participated in four rounds of the 
game in the role they were assigned in the first round.  
During the four rounds of the dictator game, two rounds resulted in allocations 
that did not favor the target (targets were allocated $0.25 and $0.30 from the $1.50 sum), 
and two rounds resulted in allocations that favored the target (targets were allocated 
$0.80 and $0.95 from the $1.50 sum). Based on previous research, allocators rarely give 
more than 50% of the sum to a target (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994), and 
thus such offers appear to be generous. I counterbalanced the good and bad events in the 
game (i.e., stingy and generous rounds) so that participants were randomly assigned the 
order in which they experienced or observed good or bad events in the situation. By 
counterbalancing the good and bad events in the situation, primacy and recency effects 
that bias what people focus on in a given situation (e.g., Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; 
Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005; Page & Norris, 
1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) could be ruled out as alternative explanations. Two 
orthogonal contrasts were set up to compare ordering effects. The first contrast, which 
assessed any primacy effects, compared responses when good (coded as 1) and bad 
(coded as -1) outcomes were delivered first. This contrast demonstrated no differences in 
allocations made based on whether a good or bad outcome was given in Round 1, t(346) 
= -.73, p = .468. The second contrast examined responses to recency effects, comparing 
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how people responded when good (coded as 1) and bad (coded as -1) outcomes were 
given in the last round. The results of this analysis also showed no differences in 
allocations made based on the order of the allocations, t(346) = .04, p = .969  
After the fourth round of the dictator game, participants were informed that the 
roles in the game were reassigned (but that the group members would stay the same). All 
participants then engaged in a single round of the dictator game as the allocator and were 
told that the allocator in the previous rounds had been assigned to be the target. The 
amount of money that participants allocated to the target of the fifth round of the game 
was used as the dependent variable representing cooperation. Following this round, the 
game was over.  
Participants were asked to fill out an adapted version of the “Feelings About the 
Relationship” subscale of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI), as it assesses willingness 
to cooperate (Curhan et al., 2006). One question, “how satisfied are you with your 
relationship with your partner?” was removed from the subscale because both groups 
could not answer the question. An additional item, “To what extent would you be willing 
to work with the allocator from rounds 1–4 in a future exercise?” was included in the 
measure instead. All items were measured on a 1 to 7 scale that corresponded with each 
question (see Appendix B). Participants responded to a manipulation check question, 
which asked them which role—target, observer, or allocator—they were first assigned. 






Results and Discussion 
 I conducted a multinominal logistic regression using maximum likelihood 
estimation to assess whether the role manipulations made participants perceive 
themselves correctly as the target or observer in the game. The results of this analysis 
suggested that the role manipulations worked as expected; 99% of those assigned to be 
targets recognized their role as such, and 95% of participants assigned to be observers 
recognized their role as an observer, χ2 = 375.62, p < .001.  
To test Hypothesis 2, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with participants’ 
allocations in the fifth round of the dictator game as the dependent variable and role as a 
target (coded as 0) or observer (coded as 1) in the first four rounds as the between-
subjects factor. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the allocations that targets made were 
larger (M = $0.54, SD = $0.45) than the allocations that observers made (M = $0.44, SD = 
$0.35), suggesting that targets were more cooperative toward the situation’s initiator than 
observers, F(1, 349) = 5.45, p = .02, η2 = .02 (see Figure 2).  
 Next, I created a scale based on the adapted version of the SVI (Curhan et al., 
2006) to further assess Hypothesis 2. I combined the items listed in Appendix B to create 
the SVI scale, which measured cooperation (α = .82). I conducted a one-way ANOVA, 
with participants’ role as the independent variable and the SVI scale as the dependent 
variable. The results of this analysis failed to support Hypothesis 2, F(1, 244) = 1.05, p = 
.307: Targets (M = 4.17, SD = 1.03) and observers (M = 4.32, SD = 1.18) were similarly 
willing to cooperate with the allocator (see Figure 3).   
 Participants’ self-reported willingness to work with the allocator in the future was 




Figure 2: Allocations made by targets and observers in Study 2 during the final round of 
the game.  
 
Figure 3: Average ratings of the Subjective Value Inventory from targets and observers.  
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for this is unclear and discussed further in the General Discussion. One possible 
explanation, however, may be related to the study design. Participants knew that the 
allocator in the previous rounds was an experimenter rather than a participant. Based on 
the seemingly neutral ratings from participants on the SVI measure in the study, it may 
have been that participants were reluctant to indicate their willingness to cooperate with 
an experimenter, assuming that the experimenter had some kind of influence on the 
outcomes in the game. Unfortunately, this speculation could not be confirmed by Study 2, 
but could be tested in Study 3, which used a similar game, but did not have the 
experimenter act as a member of the group. 
 Consistent with the theory proposed above, the pattern of results in Study 2 
demonstrated the same pattern as the results in Study 1: Observers were more negative 
than targets. This is likely because individuals’ perceptions guide their subsequent 
behavior (March, 1995). Given the link between perceptions and behavior, and the 
pattern observed across Studies 1 and 2, it seems that the positivity or negativity of a 
person’s perceptions, or the extent to which he or she focuses on good and bad events, 
should mediate the relationship between a person’s role as a target or an observer and his 
or her subsequent cooperative responses. Consistent with this logic and Proposition 3, I 
propose the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3a: The extent to which an individual focuses on bad events in a 
situation mediates the relationship between the individual’s role as a target or an 
observer and his or her willingness to cooperate with the initiator of the situation. 
Hypothesis 3b: The extent to which an individual focuses on good events in a 
situation mediates the relationship between the individual’s role as a target or an 
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observer and his or her willingness to cooperate with the initiator of the situation.  
 
Study 3: The Role of Focus in Cooperative 
Responses of Targets and Observers 
The purpose of Study 3 was to understand how individuals’ perceptions of a 
situation affected their subsequent cooperative responses by assessing Hypotheses 3a and 
3b. Thus, this study offers insight into why observers are not as willing as targets to 
cooperate. I assessed Hypotheses 1a–3b in this study, but did so in a trust game scenario 
(Berg et al., 1995), which is a slightly different ambivalent situation compared with Study 
2. Previous research has used this game to understand how cooperative behaviors change 
over time (i.e., over repeated rounds; Rotella, Richeson, Chiao, & Bean, 2013). Here, 
however, I used this game to establish an ambivalent situation, having the allocator make 
both good and bad allocations to the target. 
The first two rounds of this study included bad events (i.e., receiving nothing), 
and the latter two rounds included good events (i.e., receiving everything). Previous 
research has demonstrated that targets generally respond positively toward the allocator 
in such situations (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2006), which demonstrates the pattern outlined 
by Hypothesis 2 for targets. By ordering the good and bad events in this way, this study is 
similar to remedial actions, another ambivalent situation common to organizations in 







 Participants. Based on a power analysis conducted by Fritz and MacKinnon 
(2007) for mediation analyses using bootstrapping procedures and anticipating small to 
moderate effects, the recommended sample size was 159. Consistent with this, 160 M-
Turk participants (71 women) completed this study for payment of $0.75. On average, 
participants were 29 years old, and 75% were employed. Seventy-nine percent of 
participants identified as White/Caucasian, 3% as African-American, 10% as Asian, 3% 
as Hispanic, and the remaining 9% identified as “other.”  
 Design and procedure. This study was designed to examine the mediation 
hypotheses proposed and thus included two conditions, target and observer. Upon 
agreeing to participate in the study, participants were randomly assigned to be the target 
(Player A) or observer in a scenario-based version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995), a 
multiple round ultimatum bargaining game in which Player A has a sum of $6 that they 
must choose how to manage: Player A has the option of keeping all $6 or passing all $6 
in each round. If Player A keeps all $6, the round is over. If Player A passes all $6 to 
his/her partner (Player B), rather than keeping it, the money triples immediately, but 
Player B also has the choice to keep $18, or give Player A $9 or $18. Thus, Player A 
must trust Player B to gain a greater return, as Player A earns more money with the help 
of Player B.  
Participants were first given instructions about the trust game scenario. 
Participants in the target condition were asked to imagine themselves as Player A in the 
game. After reading the instructions, targets were told that they had already played four 
rounds with Player B and were shown the outcomes for all four rounds. After seeing the 
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outcomes of all four games, targets were asked their willingness to cooperate with Player 
B in subsequent games. Participants in the observer condition were given the same 
information as targets about the game, but were asked to imagine that they had observed 
four rounds of a game between two individuals. After reading about the four rounds, 
observers were also asked their willingness to cooperate with Player B in subsequent 
games (see Appendix C). To create an ambivalent situation, the target in all four rounds 
passed the money to Player B: In rounds 1 and 2, Player B decided to keep all $18 (i.e., 
bad events), and in rounds 3 and 4, Player B gave all $18 to the target (i.e., good events). 
I pretested the good and bad events outlined above to ensure that the bad events 
were rated as strongly negative as the good events were rated positive. Fifty participants 
(29 women) participated in this study through M-Turk. All participants were assigned the 
role of Player B in the trust game outlined above and were told what their allocations 
were across the four rounds. The Player B role was used in this game to ensure that the 
results were not biased toward the perceptions of either targets or observers in the actual 
game. At the end of the game, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (very 
negative) to 7 (very positive) the perceived negativity and positivity of each allocation. 
The ratings of the bad allocations (i.e., the allocator keeps all the money) were reverse 
scored and compared with the ratings of the good allocations (i.e., the allocator gives 
recipients all of the money), with the expectation that once reversed, the ratings of the 
bad and good events would not be different. Indeed, the results demonstrated that the 
reversed-scored ratings of the bad events (M = 2.57, SD = .84) and the good events (M = 
2.41, SD = 1.17) were about the same, t(48) = .43, p = .673, 95% CI [-.23, .35].  
In the main study, after reading the scenario, participants answered a number of 
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questions about the game, Player B’s decisions, and their own decisions. Most important, 
participants indicated how willing they were to work with Player B in the upcoming 
rounds of the game and the events in the situation that they focused on to make this 
decision. To conclude, participants were asked to fill out several demographics questions.  
 
Measures 
To test Hypotheses 1–3b, I used several measures to assess participants’ focus 
during the situation and how they intended to respond to Player B.  
Focus. To measure focus, I used the focusing illusion, defined as the extent to 
which an individual focuses on certain elements of the situation (Loewenstein & 
Fredrick, 1997; Shakade & Kahneman, 1998). Previous work on the focusing illusion has 
found that individuals may focus on a single subset of events in a situation (e.g., Shakade 
& Kahneman, 1998; Ubel, Loewenstein, & Jepson, 2005). The focusing illusion has been 
measured in the following way: After participants make a decision regarding their 
behavior, they are asked to rate the extent to which they focused on several key events 
from the situation on a scale of 1 (did not focus on this at all) to 11 (focused on this a lot). 
In this exercise, participants were asked how much they focused on Player B’s decision 
to keep all the money in the first two rounds (i.e., the bad event) and Player B’s decision 
to give the target all the money in rounds 3 and 4 (i.e., the good event).   
Willingness to cooperate. I assessed participants’ responses to Player B by 
examining their willingness to cooperate with Player B in upcoming rounds of the game, 
just as in Study 2. Thus, I used the same adapted measure of the SVI (Curhan et al., 2006) 
outlined in Study 2 to measure participants’ willingness to cooperate.  
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Manipulation check and demographics. Participants were asked to fill out a 
manipulation check about the trust game scenario that they played, which asked which 
role they were assigned during the game in the study. Participants also answered 
demographic questions including age, race, gender, education, and employment status.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 To ensure that the manipulation of participants’ roles worked as intended, I 
conducted a multinominal logistic regression analysis with participants’ assigned 
conditions as targets or observers as the independent variable and their report of their role 
as the allocator, recipient target, or observer as the dependent variable. The results of the 
analysis suggested that the manipulation worked, χ2 = 159.00, p < .001; participants 
assigned to the target condition reported that they were the target recipient in the game 
92% of the time, and those assigned to the observer condition reported that they were the 
observer of the game 100% of the time.  
I used bootstrapping methods suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008, 2009) with 
10,000 bootstrapping samples to assess mediation, which also allowed me to assess 
Hypotheses 1a–2. As a first step in the mediation, I examined the total effects model. I 
included a person’s role as a target (coded as 0) or observer (coded as 1) as the 
independent variable and willingness to cooperate with Player B as the dependent 
variable. A person’s role as a target (Player A) or observer did not affect willingness to 
cooperate with Player B, B = -.33, SE = .20, p = .10, 95% CI [-.73 .07]; observers (M = 
2.37, SD = 1.09) and targets (M = 2.70, SD = 1.43) were similarly willing to cooperate 
with the initiator of the situation. Despite a lack of support for Hypothesis 2, recent 
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research has argued that it is not required that there be a main effect between the 
independent and dependent variable for an indirect effect to occur (MacKinnon, Krull, & 
Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Thus, I next assessed the possibility of an 
indirect effect that would support Hypotheses 3a and 3b. I examined the relationships 
proposed in Hypotheses 1a and 1b between a person’s role as a target or an observer and 
the extent to which the participant focused on good and bad events in the situation. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, a person’s role affected the extent to which he or she 
focused on bad events in the situation (Hypothesis 1a), B = .85, SE = .37, p = .024, 95% 
CI [.11, 1.58]: Observers focused more on bad events (M = 9.98, SD = 1.54) than targets 
did (M = 9.13, SD = 2.96). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, a person’s role affected the 
extent to which he or she focused on good events in the situation (Hypothesis 1b), B = -
1.45, SE = .50, p = .004, 95% CI [-2.43, -.47]: Observers focused less on good events (M 
= 2.74, SD = 2.72) than did targets (M = 4.19, SD = 3.52). 
I next assessed the relationship between the extent to which individuals focused 
on good and bad events in the situation and their willingness to cooperate with Player B 
using the adapted version of the subjective value inventory scale outlined in Appendix B 
(α = .93). Consistent with the mediation hypotheses, the extent to which individuals 
focused on bad events in the situation, B = -.22, SE = .04, p < .001, 95% CI [-.30, -.14], 
and the extent to which individuals focused on good events in the situation, B = .08, SE = 
.03, p = .017, 95% CI [.02, .13], affected their subsequent willingness to cooperate with 
Player B. Specifically, as individuals focused more on good events and less on bad events 
they were more willing to cooperate with Player B. Furthermore, with the mediators 
included in the model, a person’s role as a target or observer did not have an effect on his 
  
43 
or her willingness to cooperate with Player B, B = -.04, SE = .19, p = .849, 95% CI [-.41 
.34]. The 95% confidence interval for the dual mediation model also did not include zero, 
[-.53, -.14], nor did the 95% confidence intervals for either the extent to which 
individuals focused on bad events [-.36, -.05] or the extent to which they focused on good 
events [-.29, -.02]. These results offer support for both Hypotheses 3a and 3b by 
demonstrating that the extent to which individuals focus on bad and good events in a 
situation fully mediates the relationship between their role and their willingness to 
cooperate with Player B (see Figure 4).  
The results of Study 3 demonstrated a key tenet of the theory offered above, 
extending the research on targets and observers by demonstrating that the situational role 
a person takes as a target or an observer affects his or her perceptions of a situation’s 
 
Role as target (0) 
or observer (1) 
Extent to which 
person focuses 
on bad events 
Extent to which 
person focuses 







-.33 (.20)^ (-.04 (.19)) 
Figure 4: Mediating effect of a person’s focus on the relationship between his/her 
role and willingness to cooperate, Hypotheses 1a–3b. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardized betas; standard errors are in parentheses.  
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10.  
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valence and subsequent responses. Furthermore, this research demonstrated that by 
perceiving a situation’s valence differently, individuals vary in their willingness to 
cooperate with those involved in a situation. But, amid the complexities of an actual 
organization, would the mediation found in Study 3 occur? In Study 4 I addressed this 
question.  
 
Study 4: Ballet Dancers’ Responses to Good and 
Bad Performance Feedback 
 The goal of Study 4 was to validate the findings from Study 3 in a field setting. 
Given this goal, in Study 4 I examined how a class of ballet dancers, who are targets and 
observers of the instructor’s feedback, responded to ambivalent performance feedback 
situations during their technique class. This setting models an organization in several 
ways. First, students in technique courses are developing their skills as professional ballet 
dancers; thus the work they do in the course is directly relevant to their careers. Second, 
the student cohort has both cooperative and competitive elements. For example, dancers 
must improve their technique individually so that the class improves as a company. This 
allows the class to improve their performance, which ensures that more performers get 
performing jobs. At the same time, dancers are constantly competing with one another for 
lead roles in performances. These conditions make this course an appropriate setting to 
examine how individuals respond to ambivalent situations, as such courses directly affect 
performance of the individual as well as the company and thus encourage class members 
to focus on the feedback given. Dancers in classes similar to this technique class take the 
performance feedback that they receive very personally because of the link between such 
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feedback and professional outcomes (Bracey, 2004). Furthermore, because performance 
feedback is often public, performers, such as dancers, feel pressure to adapt their 
performance to the feedback they receive, ensuring that the importance of the feedback is 
salient (Baumeister, 1984).  
 
Method 
 Participants. Participants in this study were from the University of Utah 
Department of Ballet’s freshman class. Thirty-one students were enrolled in the class. 
Two students attended class only part-time and thus declined to participate. Two full-time 
students also declined to participate, leaving 27 participants in the study (26 women). 
Students attended class twice each week for 2 hours. On average, participants had been 
dancing for 13 years; it was all dancers’ first experience dancing full time (i.e., 8–10 
hours a day in various classes including the class used in this research, 5 days a week). 
Dancers’ average age was 18, and 10% of dancers had previous professional experience. 
All dancers indicated that their purpose for being in the program was to be a professional 
dancer.  
 Design and procedure. This study was a quasi-experimental design, 
manipulating participants’ roles as either target or observer in a situation in a natural 
setting. The first day of class was used as an information session for students about the 
department. During this first class, students also learned about the current study and were 
given the opportunity to decide whether they would like to participate. The study began 
on the second day of class; at this time, students who agreed to participate were randomly 
assigned to the role of target or observer. Those assigned the role of target were asked to 
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focus on the performance feedback they personally received during each class. Those 
assigned to the role of observer were asked to focus on the performance feedback that the 
person standing next to them during class received during each class. Although not 
assigned, students typically stood in the same place in class, which often resulted in 
observers focusing on the feedback that one or two people received throughout the entire 
study given that this was all they could hear over the music played in class: In 82% of 
cases, observers focused on no more than two other dancers’ feedback during class.4 
Participants were assigned to act as either a target or an observer for all class sessions 
(i.e., assignments did not change across classes), and each participant was reminded 
about his/her role before each class. For a period of 6 weeks, the instructor’s performance 
feedback was video-recorded during class on a weekly basis.5 The videos were coded for 
good and bad feedback to ensure that each class created an ambivalent situation: none of 
the classes recorded included only good or only bad feedback. The mix of feedback 
ranged from 30% good/ 70% bad to 34% good/ 66% bad during the six class sessions 
recorded.  
Within 24 hours after each recorded class, participants were asked to fill out a 
survey about the performance feedback they received, or observed others receiving, 
during class. This time restriction was enforced to ensure that participants responded to 
the questions regarding the class that was recorded, rather than other classes that they 
attended that week. A survey link was emailed to each participant immediately after each 
                                                
 
4 All participants were the targets of the instructor’s feedback as some point during class; thus every 
participant could hear feedback directed towards others in the class.  
 
5 Students who declined to participate in the study also gave their consent to be filmed.  
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class. Students who participated in every survey were entered into a drawing for a cash 
prize of $100. On the last day of class, the class was recorded so the instructor could rate 
each student’s improvement in the class. Participants were not required to complete a 
survey following this class session.  
 
Measures  
To assess Hypotheses 1–3b, I used measures that assessed the valence of each 
student’s focus and his or her willingness to cooperate with the feedback giver (i.e., the 
instructor). Although participants’ roles as targets or observers were randomly assigned, I 
included several controls in the model including how useful participants perceived the 
feedback they were given and the amount of actual positive and negative feedback they 
personally received during class. The perceived usefulness of feedback was assessed in 
the survey following each of the six class sessions. The actual positive and negative 
feedback that participants received was assessed from the video recordings of each class. 
Additional controls were included in the first survey; these assessed participants’ dance 
experience and their tendency to be cooperative using individual difference measures. 
These and other key measures are described below.  
 Good and bad feedback. The performance feedback each participant received in 
each class was coded as positive or negative by the experimenter and three independent 
coders who each have extensive background in ballet. Feedback was coded by the 
experimenter as positive when the following feedback was given: encouragement to 
continue in the same form, indication of improvement from a previous critique, a request 
for the student to demonstrate to other students the dance move, or an indication that the 
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student was improving. Feedback was coded as negative when the following feedback 
was given: critique of a form, physical fixing of a person’s form, or a request to perform 
the move again (but not in front of the other students). Once the first class session was 
coded by the experimenter, an experienced dancer independently coded the first class 
session and explained adjustments to the experimenter’s codings that needed to be made: 
The remaining class sessions were then coded by the experimenter. The two additional 
coders coded four of the six class sessions independently of the experimenter. Reliability 
between these codings and the experimenter’s codings was acceptable for both positive 
feedback, r(99) = .81, p < .001, and negative feedback, r(99) = .91, p < .001. All 
feedback was linked to the target of the feedback, which allowed for the actual good and 
bad feedback that participants received each day to be controlled for and ensure that the 
results of the study were not due to participants receiving more positive or negative 
feedback. In most cases, participants did not receive an equal amount of positive and 
negative feedback in a given day. The average codings from each day of class were 
examined to ensure that each class created an ambivalent situation, or in other words 
included both negative and positive feedback to students and/or the class as a whole.   
Self/other feedback and focus. I used cognitive elaboration, which identifies the 
events in a situation that participants focus on most (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), to assess 
the extent to which individuals focused on positive and negative feedback. This measure 
uses self-report responses. In the survey, participants were asked to write about four 
pieces of feedback from the instructor that they received, or heard, that stuck out to them 
during class. After writing about four events, participants were asked to indicate whether 
each piece of feedback was good or bad by placing a “+” or “-” by the positive and 
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negative feedback, respectively. Thus, this measure assessed good and bad events in a 
slightly different way compared with the previous studies by forcing participants to 
choose whether the events were more positive than negative, or more negative than 
positive. Because many studies assessing valence assume that positivity and negativity 
are the endpoints on a single continuum rather than assuming that positivity and 
negativity are orthogonal (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Pyszczynski, 
Hamilton, Herring, & Greenberg, 1989), this measure allowed me to assess whether, if 
forced to determine the valence of a situation as either positive or negative, a similar 
pattern of results would emerge as when the positivity and negativity of a person’s focus 
was assumed to be orthogonal. Additionally, I asked participants to answer several 
questions about each response they gave, to gauge the relative importance of each event 
included on the list using an adapted version of the cognitive elaboration measure by 
Reynolds (1997). Participants were asked the questions from this measure that addressed 
the extent to which they thought about each event, answering each question on a 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. These items were intended to be used as a 
control and can be found in Appendix D.   
Cooperation. To assess their willingness to cooperate with the instructor, 
participants answered the following questions on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) scale: 
“How much would you like to work with this instructor in the future?”; “How willing are 
you to accept feedback from this instructor?”; “How much do you trust the instructor?”; 
and “How interested are you in the instructor’s perspective or opinion?” I adapted these 
questions from O’Connor, Arnold, and Burris (2005) and combined them to create a scale 
measure of participants’ willingness to cooperate with the instructor (α = .87).  
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Performance. Following the last round of responses from participants, the class 
was filmed one final time. The instructor, blind to the condition assigned to each student, 
then coded each participant’s improvement over the course of the 6 weeks. Specifically, 
the instructor was asked to rate each student on how much he or she had improved during 
the class on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal). These improvement scores acted 
as an additional measure of cooperation, as willingness to accept the instructor’s 
feedback and cooperate with the suggestions made is a large part of how a dancer 
improves his or her technique.   
Additional questions. At the beginning of each survey, participants were asked 
whether they paid attention to the feedback they received or the feedback that someone 
else received. This question was used as a manipulation check to ensure that participants 
knew their role during class. To conclude the survey, participants were asked two 
questions: “The feedback I (the other person) received today helped me learn how to 
improve my performance” (Anseel, Lievens, & Schollaert, 2009), which was measured 
on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale and used as a control variable. The 
second question, “How anxious are you to work with the instructor in the next class 
session?”, was rated on a scale of 1 (not at all anxious) to 7 (very anxious) and included 
to further assess participants’ resistance to work with the instructor.6 
In the survey following the first class session, students filled out several questions 
that were used as control variables.  Participants answered questions regarding the 
agreeableness dimension of the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1985), using a personality 
                                                
 
6 This was a last-minute suggestion made by the Ballet Department Chair to use as a dependent variable. 
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assessment which asks participants to assess themselves on several characteristics related 
to agreeableness using a 1 (extremely inaccurate) to 9 (extremely accurate) scale 
(Saucier, 1994). Agreeableness has been shown to affect individuals’ willingness to 
cooperate with others (Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001). Participants 
also responded to demographic questions including gender, to ensure that men (who are 
the clear minority in the class) were not treated differently or consistently responding 
differently than women; years dancing; and professional experience (coded as 0 for no 
experience, or 1 for experience), including whether they have had any lead roles (coded 
as 0 for no lead roles, or 1 for having lead roles), all of which assessed participants’ 
experience in receiving feedback, which may have affected how they responded to the 
feedback they received (Barrell & Terry, 2003; Walker & Nordin-Bates, 2010).7  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Two participants repeatedly complained about their assigned role as an observer, 
claiming it was affecting their performance in the class. In both cases, participants stated 
in their complaints that they would not continue to do as their instructions asked. 
Additionally, two participants either missed class or skipped the survey more than twice. 
These participants were removed from the analysis, leaving 23 participants in the study.8  
 Because feedback was nested within classes, I assessed the data to see whether 
multilevel analyses were required. Previous work on multilevel analyses suggests that the 
                                                
 
7 Many of these controls were determined through discussion with the Chair of the Ballet Department and 
based on specific differences and challenges that are unique to dancers.  
 
8 Note that the results reported below are when those who complained and those who missed more than two 
surveys were removed from the analysis. Results including these individuals are included in footnotes.  
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interclass correlation (ICC) of the dataset is a good assessment of whether the data 
necessitate multilevel analysis (Luke, 2004). Higher ICC values indicate that the level 1 
variables contribute little knowledge to the model over and above level 2 variables 
(Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009). Accordingly, I calculated the ICC using the class session 
as the independent variable and the difference score between the average amount of good 
and bad feedback for each class session as the dependent variable. The ICC value 
suggested that there was not enough difference across each class session to necessitate 
multilevel analyses, ICC(1) = .13, 95% CI [-.05, .30]. Furthermore, it is recommended 
that the higher level data have 30 or more unique observations for reliable multilevel 
analyses (Maas & Hox, 2005), which means that 30 or more class sessions would need to 
be recorded. In this research, there were only six unique observations (i.e., class 
sessions), suggesting that the number of observations recommended for multilevel 
analyses was too low. Based on the results of the ICC calculation, as well as the low 
number of class sessions, I chose not to use multilevel analyses; rather, I assessed the 
results at the individual level using bootstrapping, as suggested by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008, 2009), and controlling for the class session to ensure that any effect was not 
explained by a particular class session.  
 To ensure that the manipulation of participants’ roles worked, I conducted a 
binary logistic regression analysis with the participants’ assigned conditions as the 
independent variable and their report of whether they were told to focus on their own or 
others feedback as the dependent variable. The results of the analysis suggested that the 
manipulation worked, χ2 = 122.37, p < .001; participants assigned to the target condition 
reported that they were asked to recall the feedback that they received 95% of the time, 
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and those assigned to the observer condition reported that they were asked to recall 
feedback that others received 95% of the time.  
The four items outlined by O’Connor and colleagues (2005) were combined to 
create a scale representing participants’ willingness to cooperate (α = .86). The items 
comprising the agreeableness scale from the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1985) were also 
combined (α = .82). To create a measure of focus, the number of times each participant 
rated the four items of feedback they recalled during class as negative was counted; thus 
higher numbers represented an increased focus on the negative aspects of the situation, 
which in using the cognitive elaboration measure, and also resulted in a decreased focus 
on positive aspects of the situation. 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables are listed in 
Table 1. I used participants’ self-reported willingness to cooperate with the instructor, as 
measured by O’Connor and colleagues’ (2005) scale, as the dependent variable. To 
examine Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I used bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009) 
with 10,000 samples.9 First the total effects model was assessed. No relationship was 
found between a person’s role as a target (coded as 0; M = 6.66, SD = .47) or an observer 
(coded as 1; M = 6.55, SD = .49) and his or her self-reported willingness to cooperate 
with the instructor, B = -.12, SE = .09, p = .19, 95% CI [-.29, .06]; therefore, Hypothesis 
2 was not supported. Given that a main effect between the independent and dependent 
                                                
 
9 Note that when including those who complained and who missed two or more surveys, the results of the 
study did not support the hypotheses, although continued to be in the same direction as the reported results 
in the main text. Specifically, participants’ roles as targets or observers had no effect on their cooperative 
behaviors, B = .02, SE = .09, p = .852, 95% CI [-.16, .19]. Additionally, there was no effect of participants’ 
roles on the extent to which they focused on negative feedback, B = .06, SE = .18, p = .75, 95% CI [-.29, 
.41], and the indirect effect of the model included zero in the confidence interval, 95% CI [-.01, .19], 
suggesting that no indirect effect occurred.  
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variable is not required for an indirect effect (MacKinnon et al., 2000; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002), an indirect effect of participants’ roles on cooperative behavior through the extent 
to which they focused on good and bad feedback was examined. Consistent with 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b, being a target or an observer affected the extent to which 
participants focused on negative feedback, B = .36, SE = .17, p = .036, 95% [.02, .70]: 
Observers focused more on negative feedback (M = 1.74, SD = 1.09) than did targets (M 
= 1.39, SD = .77), and because in this study negative and positive feedback were not 
orthogonal, this also meant that observers focused less on positive feedback compared 
with targets. The extent to which individuals focused on feedback also affected 
cooperative behavior, B = .18, SE = .05, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .27]. Participants’ roles as 
targets or observers indirectly affected their willingness to cooperate through the extent to 
which they focused on feedback, 95% CI [.01, .14], consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 
3b. However, inconsistent with the hypotheses, focusing more on bad feedback, and less 
on good feedback, led individuals to be more willing to cooperate with the instructor.10 
Thus, although observers did focus more on negative feedback compared with targets, 
this focus made observers more, rather than less, cooperative toward the instructor. 
I also assessed the instructor’s ratings of participants’ improvement in the class as 
an additional measure of participants’ cooperation with the instructor. I again used  
                                                
 
10 The results reported in the two mediation studies in Study 4 are the results found when not including 
control variables. However, these results remain consistent when controlling for the following variables: 
perceived usefulness of feedback, dancing experience, professional experience, trait agreeableness, actual 
positive and negative feedback received during class, class session, the intensity to which people focused 
on the feedback they heard or received, the interaction between this intensity and actual positive feedback, 
and the interaction between this intensity and actual negative feedback. Although professional lead roles 





bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, 2009) to assess the mediation proposed in 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b. I first assessed the total effects model, which demonstrated a 
relationship between a person’s role as a target (coded as 0) or an observer (coded as 1) 
and his or her improvement in the class, B = 1.22, SE = .31, p < .001, 95% CI [.51, 1.73]. 
However, this relationship was again in the opposite direction predicted by Hypothesis 2; 
observers improved more (M = 5.29, SD = 1.58) than targets (M = 4.17, SD = 1.86) in the 
class, suggesting that they were more willing to cooperate with the instructor. 11  While 
this finding demonstrates a similar pattern compared with the self-report measure above, 
it is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. As demonstrated in the previous mediation model, 
being a target (coded as 0) or an observer (coded as 1) affected the extent to which 
participants focused on negative feedback such that observers focused more on negative 
feedback (M = 1.74, SD = 1.08), and less on positive feedback, compared with targets (M 
= 1.39, SD = .77), B = .35, SE = .17, p = .045, 95% [.01, .68]. Again, the extent to which 
individuals focused on feedback affected cooperative behavior, B = .57, SE = .16, p < 
.001, 95% [.26, .89]. Participants’ roles as targets or observers also indirectly affected 
their willingness to cooperate through the extent to which they focused on feedback, 95% 
CI [.01, .46], consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b. But, as with the self-report of 
participants’ willingness to cooperate with the instructor, the direction of the effects in 
the model was inconsistent with the theory proposed; greater focus on negative feedback 
                                                
 
11 Note that when including those who complained and who missed two or more surveys, there was still a 
main effect of a person’s role as target or observer on their improvement in the class (as rated by the 
instructor), B = 1.42, SE = .29, p < .001, 95% CI [.86, 1.99]. However, there was no relationship between a 
person’s role as target or observer and their focus on negative feedback, B = .05, SE = .18, p = .789, 95% 
CI [-.30, .40], and the indirect effect crossed zero, 95% CI [-.07, .14], suggesting that no mediation effect 
occurred.  	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made participants more willing to cooperate with the instructor. 
Consistent with Studies 1 and 3, Study 4 demonstrated support for Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b that observers focus more on bad events, and less on good events, as compared 
with targets. Thus, this study suggests that even in a complex setting, observers perceive 
the situation more negatively than do targets, demonstrating the robustness of this effect. 
Furthermore, this research demonstrated that a person’s role as a target or an observer in 
a given situation indirectly affects cooperative behavior through the person’s perceptions, 
demonstrating that perceptions affect behavior. However, unlike Studies 2 and 3, which 
supported the notion that a greater focus on bad events, and a lesser focus on good events, 
hindered cooperative behavior, this study demonstrated that focusing on the negative 
encourages students to be more, rather than less, willing to cooperate with the instructor.  
The results of Study 4 are unexpected and puzzling: Why would a person’s role as 
a target or an observer result in an increased focus on negative feedback, but then also 
increased cooperation? Although data from Study 4 cannot directly address this question, 
some insight can be offered. As described above, the extent to which a dancer is anxious 
about the next class session was measured in each survey. When this variable was 
included in the mediation analysis as a dependent variable, the extent to which 
individuals focused on positive and negative feedback appeared to mediate the 
relationship between a person’s role as a target or an observer and his or her anxiety for 
the next class, 95% CI [.03, .73]: Observers focused more on negative feedback, and 
consequently, had increased anxiety in the next class. Based on this result, it may be that 
as new students in the program, dancers are unsure of what to expect from the instructor, 
thus when observers hear feedback directed toward others, they immediately assume the 
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worst, which makes them become more anxious.  
The relationship between observers’ greater focus on negative feedback and 
anxiety is consistent with previous research on performers in general, which demonstrates 
that anxiety can be a response to negative performance feedback or reviews, particularly 
when it comes from an expert (e.g., peers, instructor, director). The type of anxiety that 
results from such negative feedback often inhibits performers’ abilities (Helin, 1989; 
Liston, Frost & Mohr, 2003; Seta, Crisson, Seta, & Wang, 1989) and ultimately can have 
a negative impact on the dancer and his or her performance (Harris, 2013; Walker & 
Nordin-Bates, 2010). Such anxiety causes individuals to engage in behaviors that allow 
them to quickly escape the situation making them feel anxious (Marks & Neese, 1994). 
To overcome such anxiety, observers may have believed that the easiest way to “escape” 
or avoid similar treatment from the instructor was through cooperation, rather than 
responding in negative ways, which may increase conflict, and in turn participants’ 
anxiety.  
However, it is also a possibility that the type of anxiety observers experienced 
was more positive. Previous research has shown that certain types of anxiety can actually 
help enhance performance (e.g., Martens & Landers, 1970; Walker & Nordin-Bates, 
2010). Although previous research would suggest that instructors often cause the type of 
anxiety that has negative effects on performers (e.g., Helin, 1989; Liston et al., 2003), 
there is the possibility that when reporting their level of anxiety for the next class session, 
dancers may have been reporting heightened levels of anxiety that are associated with 
improved performance and increased effort and motivation toward improving one’s skills 
(Martens & Landers, 1970), which may also explain the results of Study 4.  
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Attempting to understand how dancers respond to anxiety brings up another issue 
and possible explanation for the alternative effects of Study 4 compared with the other 
studies conducted. That is, even though dancers recognized that they were receiving or 
overhearing negative performance feedback, did they actually perceive the feedback as a 
bad event? Some discussion from dance professionals would suggest that it depends on 
the type of negative feedback the instructor is giving. Negative feedback can be either 
constructive, in the sense that it is something that the dancer can actually improve with 
further work and proper instruction, or such feedback can be destructive, critiquing the 
individual rather than his or her skill and offering no solution for improvement in the 
future (Taylor, 1987). Although traditional teaching styles of ballet used the destructive 
form of negative feedback (Taylor, 1987), many instructors today are sensitive to 
dancers’ feelings and self-confidence and instead choose to use constructive forms of 
negative feedback (Landau, 2013). The constructive and destructive forms of feedback 
mentioned above mirror challenge and hindrance stressors, respectively. Challenge 
stressors are stressors that are perceived to promote achievement or personal growth and 
ultimately improve a person’s effort and performance (Le Pine, Podsakoff, & LePine, 
2005). Thus, even though they are negative, they motivate individuals and often result in 
heightened performance. Hindrance stressors threaten personal growth and result in 
withdrawal and coping behaviors (LePine et al., 2005). The pattern of results in Study 4 
suggests that dancers, although recognizing (and reporting) the feedback from the study 
as negative, may have perceived such negative information as a source of motivation in 
the situation, responding in a manner that suggests that the dancers perceived the negative 
feedback as a challenge stressor (LePine et al., 2005). 
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Another possible explanation is that there is a difference between performance 
feedback and the allocation of money, the latter being the focus in Studies 2 and 3. 
Indeed, negative performance feedback offers individuals an opportunity to increase their 
persistence on the task at hand to demonstrate their true capabilities and the accuracy of 
feedback (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002; Trope & Ben-Yair, 1982). In contrast, there is 
no opportunity in the dictator game to improve the allocation received through 
persistence or engagement in other behaviors. Thus, an important moderator in the link 
between a person’s perceptions of the valence and subsequent cooperative behavior may 
be whether the person actually believes that cooperative behavior can improve the 
situation. Further discussion of these findings is presented in the general discussion.  
 
Study 5: Perspective Taking as a Way to Attenuate 
Observers’ Negative Perceptions 
 The studies thus far have demonstrated that observers focus more on bad events in 
situations compared with targets. And, as Studies 2 and 3 have suggested, in many cases 
observers’ focus appears to discourage them from engaging in cooperative behavior in 
competitive situations such as distributions in which one person’s gain appears to be 
another person’s loss. Because organizations are often competitive contexts, it seems that 
it is important for organizations to encourage observers to have positive perceptions of 
the situations they observe, which may result in positive, or cooperative, behavior. Such 
behavior in the organization may also benefit observers personally, as it can improve the 
interpersonal relationships and outcomes that they experience (De Dreu, 2010; Smith et 
al., 1995). Because targets have more positive perceptions of the situation compared with 
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observers, observers may gain a more positive perspective, and engage in cooperative 
behavior, when they develop perceptions similar to targets’ perceptions. Such a change in 
perception can be encouraged through perspective taking (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 
2001; Grant & Berry, 2011; Parker & Axtell, 2001). As observers recognize a target’s 
point of view, it may help them shift focus from the bad events in the situation to the 
good events, much like a target’s perception. Consistent with this logic, and Proposition 
4, I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 4a: Observers who take a target’s perspective focus less on bad 
events in the situation than observers who do not take a target’s perspective. 
Hypothesis 4b: Observers who take a target’s perspective focus more on good 
events in the situation than observers who do not take a target’s perspective. 
 
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred and fifty-two undergraduate students (53 women) at 
the University of Utah participated in this study for partial course credit. The average age 
of participants was 23 years old; 66% of participants identified as White, 24% as Asian, 
3% as Latino/Hispanic, and 7% identified as other.  
Design and procedure. Study 5 had a 2 (target, observer) X 2 (perspective 
taking, control) design. Including targets in the study design created a comparison group 
for the observer condition and also allowed for further exploratory research related to 
Proposition 4.  
 The study procedures generally followed those of Study 2, except this study was 
conducted in a traditional laboratory setting with a university student sample. Upon 
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agreeing to participate in the study, participants were informed that they would be 
playing a dictator game with another participant and the experimenter on the computer. 
Participants were instructed how to play the dictator game and were told that they could 
be assigned the role of the allocator, target (i.e., recipient), or observer in the game. In 
reality, the experimenter was assigned to play the role of allocator, leaving participants to 
be assigned to either the target or the observer role. Participants were assigned a role and 
told that their role could change before any round, but that the three individuals in their 
group would not change during the entire study.  
 Next, participants saw the instructions for the dictator game. In addition to their 
assigned role of target or observer, participants were randomly assigned to perspective 
taking or control conditions. Participants in the control condition saw the instructions for 
the dictator game, as in Study 2. Participants in the perspective taking condition saw the 
dictator game instructions and a manipulation of perspective taking adapted from 
Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White (2008). Observers (targets) read the following: 
As you learn of the (your) outcome in this game, take the perspective of the 
student who is the recipient (observer) in this round. Try to understand what he or 
she is thinking in this situation. Try to visualize yourself in that role, thinking as 
the recipient (observer). 
 After four rounds of the game, participants were asked to answer questions 
regarding the rounds that they had been focusing on using the focusing illusion measure 
described in Study 3 (Loewenstein & Fredrick, 1997; Shakade & Kahneman, 1998), a 





I collected several measures to assess participants’ focus, individual differences, 
and whether the manipulation of role worked in the study. I used the focusing illusion 
measure described in Study 3 (Loewenstein & Fredrick, 1997; Shakade & Kahneman, 
1998) to measure focus, which was the dependent variable. Participants also answered 
demographic questions regarding age, gender, race, and education. I measured trait-based 
empathy (Davis, 1980) to use as a control in the model, as previous research has 
recognized the similarities between perspective-taking and empathy (e.g., Davis, 1980), 
which may result in any observed effects of perspective taking being explained by a 
person’s empathetic concern. Finally, participants answered two manipulation checks. 
First, participants answered a question related to which role they were assigned during 
the game; allocator, target recipient, or observer. Second, participants answered two 
questions regarding perspective taking, “I tried to understand the other participant better 
by imagining how things looked from his or her perspective,” and “I tried to put myself 
in the other participant’s shoes” on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) scale.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 I began by conducting two analyses to ensure that the manipulations worked as 
intended. First, I assessed the effectiveness of the role manipulation by running a 
multinominal regression analysis using participants’ assigned condition as the 
independent variable, and their reported role as the dependent variable. The results of this 
analysis suggested that the role manipulation worked, χ2 = 128.50, p < .001. Specifically, 
participants who were assigned to the target condition reported that they were the target 
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recipient in the game 92% of the time, and those assigned to the observer condition 
reported that they were the observer of the game 91% of the time. Second, to assess the 
perspective taking manipulation I combined the two items assessing the effectiveness of 
the perspective taking manipulation to create a measure of perspective taking, r(152) = 
.36, p <.001. I conducted a one-way ANOVA using participants’ perspective taking 
condition as the independent variable and the two-item measure representing perspective 
taking as the dependent variable to ensure that the perspective taking manipulation 
worked as intended. The analysis showed that the perspective taking manipulation 
worked; those who read the perspective taking manipulation reported engaging in more 
perspective taking than those in the control group, F(1, 151) = 6.47, p = .012.  
 To assess Hypotheses 4a and 4b, I conducted a 2 X 2 ANOVA examining the 
interaction between a person’s role as target (coded as 0) or observer (coded as 1) and 
engagement in perspective taking (0 = control, 1 = perspective taking) on the extent to 
which the person focused on good and bad events. I first examined Hypothesis 4a, which 
focuses on bad events. Although no main effect emerged for a person’s role as target 
versus observer, F(1, 152) = .71, p = .400, η2 = .01, or for perspective taking, F(1, 152) = 
.07, p = .911, η2 = 0, an interaction did emerge between a person’s role and perspective 
taking on the extent to which they focused on bad events, F(1, 152) = 4.26, p = .041, η2 = 
.03. Specifically, in the control condition, observers focused on the bad events in the 
situation (M = 6.10, SD = 2.22) more than targets did, (M = 4.97, SD = 2.11), while in the 
perspective taking condition, there were no differences between targets (M = 5.73, SD = 
2.42) and observers (M = 5.26, SD = 2.72) in the extent to which they focused on the bad 
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events in the situation (see Figure 5). 12 
I next assessed Hypothesis 4b using the same 2 X 2 ANOVA. Again, no main 
effects emerged for a person’s role as a target or an observer, F(1, 152) = .73, p = .394, η2 
= .01, or for perspective taking, F(1, 152) = .06, p = .803, η2 = 0. Furthermore, 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 4b, there was no effect of the interaction between a person’s 
role in the situation and perspective taking on the extent to which the person focused on 
good events, F(1, 152) = .1, p = .935, η2 = 0: Targets (M = 6.42, SD = 2.58) and observers 
(M = 6.79, SD = 2.43) focused about equally on good events in the control condition, and 
in the perspective taking condition, both targets (M = 6.36, SD = 1.89) and observers (M 
= 6.65, SD = 2.39) also focused about the same on good events. Thus Hypothesis 4b was 
not supported (see Figure 6).  
The above results offer support for Proposition 4, but only in terms of the extent 
to which individuals focused on bad events. Specifically, taking the target’s perspective 
helped observers focus less on bad events, supporting Hypothesis 4a, but no support was 
found for Hypothesis 4b, that taking the target’s perspective would affect the extent to 
which observers focused on good events in a situation. Likewise, perspective taking 
changed the extent to which targets focused on bad events, but had no effect on the extent 
to which targets focused on good events. Such results suggest that perspective taking can 
change a person’s perceptions of the valence of a situation, but this effect may be driven 
by how much a person focuses on the bad events in the situation.  
Lack of support for Hypothesis 4b may be due to a ceiling effect in participants’ 
ratings of the extent to which they focused on good events. In looking at Figures 5 and 6, 
                                                
 




Figure 5: Extent to which participants focused on bad events in the situation, moderated 
by perspective taking, Study 5.  
 
 
Figure 6: Extent to which participants focused on good events in the situation, 
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it seems that participants in every condition focused more on good events than they did 
on bad events. This is in contrast to Hypotheses 1a and 1b and the findings in Study 1, 
which suggest that individuals focus more on negative events in the situation than 
positive events. One reason this pattern may have emerged that is consistent with the  
theory proposed in Chapter 1 is that the sample in Study 5, undergraduate students, is 
different than in previous studies. When such participants entered the study, they were 
assigned to work with another student and the experimenter. This group was necessary to 
ensure that the experimenter created an ambivalent situation, but also could have made 
the participant’s membership as a student in the group more salient, as it highlighted the 
participant’s in-group (i.e., the other student) and out-group (i.e., the experimenter). The 
theory presented in Chapter 1 suggests that when group membership is salient, 
individuals will be motivated to focus more on positive events in the situation over 
negative events, particularly when they perceive the out-group as positive. It is likely 
that, because participants were not familiar with the structure of participation in 
laboratory studies at this university at the time of the study, many participants perceived 
working with an experimenter as positive as it could help them gain credit for the study. 
This suggests that social motivations may be made salient in other ways besides being a 
target in the situation. Thus, group salience may have been heightened for all participants, 







Role Effects on Perceived Valence of a Situation and  
Cooperative Responses: A Meta-Analysis 
 In the above five studies, I assessed the effects of a person’s role as a target or 
observer on his or her perceived valence of the situation and subsequent cooperative 
responses. The results of these studies suggest that targets adopt more negative 
perceptions of a situation compared with observers. However, two things remain unclear: 
First, it is unclear whether observers’ negative perceptions are a result of one’s focus on 
good events, bad events, or both. Second, it remains unclear whether observers are more 
or less willing than targets to cooperate in a situation. Given these issues, I conducted 
meta-analyses across the studies conducted above to assess the relationships between a 
person’s role and his or her focus on good and bad events and willingness to cooperate 
with others.  
 In the first meta-analysis, I estimated the effect size between individuals’ roles as 
targets or observers and their focus on bad events across all studies assessing this 
relationship (i.e., Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5). The results of the meta-analysis demonstrated a 
small to moderate effect (Cohen, 1992), d = -.29, se = .09, 95% CI [-.47, -.11].13 The 
direction of the effect suggests that targets focus less on bad events in a situation than 
observers do, offering further support for Hypothesis 1a (see Table 2). I used these same 
studies to conduct a second meta-analysis estimating the effect size between individuals’ 
roles as targets or observers and their focus on good events. Consistent with the findings  
                                                
 
13 Note that random effects models were used to for all assessments of effect sizes for several reasons, 
including that the small samples and different study procedures used in each study allow for greater 
possibility that there may be differences in effect sizes across studies and that the goal of the meta-analysis 
was to further assess generalizability of the hypothesized effects (Hedges & Vevea, 1998).  
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related to bad events, the results of the meta-analysis demonstrated a small to moderate 
effect (Cohen, 1992), d = .33, se = .10, 95% CI [.13, .52]. The direction of the effect 
suggests that targets focus more on good events than observers do and offers further 
support for Hypothesis 1b (see Table 3).  
To assess the effect of individuals’ roles on their cooperative behavior, I 
conducted meta-analyses assessing individuals’ actual cooperative behavior, individuals’ 
self-reported willingness to cooperate, and the combined effects of these measures. 
Results of the meta-analyses show small effects (Cohen, 1992) for actual cooperative 
behavior, d = .09, se = .92, 95% CI [-1.72, 1.88], self-reported willingness to cooperate, d 
= .02, se = .12, 95% CI [-.21, .26], and individuals’ overall cooperativeness, d = .06, se = 
31, 95% CI [-.55, .67]. In all cases, the direction of the effect sizes suggest that targets  
 
Table 2: Meta-Analytic Summary of Effect Sizes of a Person’s Role as Target or 
















Study 1 70 4.71 -1.74 33.3 -0.31 0.35 [-.65, .04] 60 5.01 
Study 3 77 9.13 -2.28 40 -0.36 0.32 [-.68, -.04] 82 9.98 
Study 4 70 1.61 -0.27 33.3 -0.05 0.34 [-.39, .29] 65 1.66 
Study 5 (control 
condition only) 
39 4.97 -2.32 19.2 -0.52 0.45 [-.97, -.07] 42 6.1 
 Fixed Effect 





  -0.29 0.09 [-.47, -.11] 
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Table 3: Meta-Analytic Summary of Effect Sizes of a Person’s Role as Target or 















Study 1 70 4.21 2.14 33.3 0.38 0.35 [.02, .72] 60 3.63 
Study 3 77 4.19 2.91 38.5 0.46 0.32 [.14, .78] 82 2.74 





-0.65 19.6 -0.15 0.44 [-.59, .29] 42 6.79 
 
Fixed Effect 
Estimation   0.33 0.09 [.15, .50] 
Random Effect 
Estimation    0.33 0.1 [.13, .52] 
 
were more cooperative than observers, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, because 
all confidence intervals crossed zero, it cannot be concluded that targets were actually 











Table 4: Meta-Analytic Summary of Effect Sizes of a Person’s Role as Target or 















Cooperation (behavioral measures) 





-4.86 31.3 -0.84 0.35 [-1.19, -.49] 66 5.47 
        
Fixed Effect 
Estimation   0.47 0.1 [.28, .66] 
Random Effect 
Estimation   0.09 0.92 
[-1.72, 
1.88] 
 Cooperation (self-reported measures) 
Study 2 
122 4.18 
-1.03 62.5 -0.13 0.25 [-.38, .12] 123 4.32 
Study 3 
77 2.71 
1.62 38.5 0.26 0.31 [-.05, .58] 82 2.37 
Study 4 
69 6.59 
-1.87 33.3 -0.02 0.34 [-.36, .32] 63 6.6 
        
Fixed Effect 




Estimation   0.02 0.12 
[-.21, 
.26] 
 Cooperation (combined) 
Fixed Effect 
Estimation   0.21 0.06 [.09, .34] 
Random Effect 









GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The primary goal of this dissertation was to extend the research on how targets’ 
and observers’ perceptions differ by examining differences in perceptions of the valence 
of a situation. The primary proposition was that observers perceive the situation as more 
negative than do targets. Across four studies that examined ambivalent situations in 
contexts related to organizational settings, support for this proposition was found. Study 1 
showed that observers had more negative perceptions of work experiences compared with 
targets, as they brought up fewer good events, and slightly more bad events, in the 
situations they described. In Study 3, a multiround bargaining game, observers focused 
more on bad events, and less on good events, compared with targets (i.e., recipients). 
Study 4 demonstrated that ballet dancers who observed the feedback that others received 
perceived more feedback to be negative than did the targets of the feedback, 
demonstrating that observers’ perceptions are more negative than targets’ perceptions 
even in complex situations. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that taking the target’s 
perspective attenuates observers’ negative perceptions by making their focus more 
similar to targets’ focus on bad events. Across the studies, whether observers’ negative 
perceptions were due to their increased focus on bad events or their decreased focus on 
good events varied. However, two meta-analyses support the idea that observers’ 
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perceptions are more negative by demonstrating that observers focused more on bad 
events and less on good events compared with targets.  
A second set of propositions in this research was that observers, compared with 
targets, have more negative responses to a situation as a result of their more negative 
perceptions. Cooperation toward the initiator of the situation was focused on as a 
response, as it has important implications for group performance (Beersma et al., 2003) 
and employee satisfaction (Smith et al., 1995). Study 2 showed that observers in 
ambivalent situations were less willing to cooperate with an allocator in a dictator game 
compared with targets. Study 3 demonstrated that this lack of cooperation from observers 
was a result of their negative perceptions of the situation. Although Study 4, which tested 
the mediation hypothesis in a sample of ballet dancers, also demonstrated that a person’s 
perceptions affected his or her willingness to cooperate with the instructor, this study 
showed that negative perceptions resulted in dancers being more, rather than less, willing 
to cooperate with the instructor, as predicted by Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Reflecting these 
conflicting results, a meta-analysis further supported the idea that there is not a clear 
consistent relationship between a person’s role and his or her cooperative response. Why 
this behavior may have occurred is discussed in the Limitations section.   
 
Theoretical Contributions 
 Extending the list of how individuals’ perceptions of a situation vary to include 
valence is the biggest theoretical contribution of this research. Although previous work 
has recognized that individuals tend to focus on bad events in a situation more than good 
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzmann, 2001), research has generally ignored the 
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situational factors that may affect the extent to which individuals focus on bad events 
over good events. Drawing from previous work on targets’ and observers’ unique 
perceptions (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972), the current research argued that observers have 
more negative perceptions of a situation compared with targets. By offering support for 
this argument in contexts that share features with many organizational settings, this 
research makes contributions to both social psychology and management literatures. The 
specific contributions made to three bodies of literature—differences in self and other 
experiences, biases toward negative perceptions, and factors affecting cooperative 
behavior—are discussed below. 
 
Self versus Other Experiences 
 Targets and observers have different perceptions of a situation (Jones & Nisbett, 
1972; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Trope & Liberman, 2010). However, 
this argument is limited to how targets’ and observers’ perceptions vary in the amount of 
detail they recognize. By limiting the research to this single dimension of how targets’ 
and observers’ perceptions differ, the differences between targets’ and observers’ 
perceptions of the valence of a situation have been overlooked. But because situational 
differences can affect a person’s perceptions of the valence of a situation (De Cremer & 
van Knippenberg, 2002; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006), it seems likely that there is a 
difference between targets’ and observers’ perceptions of a situation’s valence. The 
current research thus contributes to the literature on the self versus other experience by 
identifying an additional way in which the perceptions of those who experience a 
situation themselves systematically differ from those who experience the situation 
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through others.  
 Differences in perceptions of a situation’s valence offer an additional explanation 
for many phenomena partially explained by the distinction between how much detail 
targets and observers recognize. Individuals’ tendencies to stereotype, attribute others’ 
behaviors to personal characteristics yet their own behavior to situational factors, and 
judge others more harshly than themselves have all been attributed to differences in the 
amount of detail individuals recognize in the situation (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; 
Gilbert, 1998; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Kelley, 1973; Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 
2003). Demonstrating that observers have more negative perceptions of a situation than 
targets do can provide an additional explanation for these effects. For example, observers 
may judge those involved in a situation more harshly than targets do because they 
recognize less detail than targets do and/or because they perceive the situation as more 
negative than do targets. Other phenomena related to targets and observers that cannot be 
explained by differences in detail recognition can also be explained by differences in the 
perceptions of the valence of a situation. The self-serving bias, for example, which 
suggests that targets attribute good outcomes to their own behavior and bad outcomes to 
situational factors (Greenwald, 1980), cannot be explained by the amount of detail a 
person recognizes, but can be explained by the person’s perceptions of a situation’s 
valence. Specifically, the self-serving bias suggests that, consistent with the propositions 
outlined in Chapter 1, targets attempt to focus more on good events in the situation while 
minimizing bad events.  
 Moreover, a motivational explanation for why targets’ and observers’ perceptions 
vary was offered, arguing that the salience of targets’ and observers’ motivations are 
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different in a given situation. Although these motivations are not empirically tested in this 
research, they offer one explanation as to why a target may perceive a situation as more 
positive, and less negative, compared with an observer. This explanation also introduced 
one way in which observers’ perceptions can become more positive—through taking the 
perspective of a target. Perspective takers can better understand the underlying 
motivations of those whose perspectives they take (Davis, 1983), which arguably helps 
make observers’ perceptions more similar to targets’ perceptions. Indeed, the observers in 
Study 5 who adopted the target’s perspective had a more positive perception of the 
situation than observers who did not take the target’s perspective. Arguably, the reason 
why observers who adopted the target’s perspective had a similarly valenced perception 
as targets did is because they also adopted the motivations of targets.  
 
The Bias Toward Negative Perceptions 
 This is also the first research to argue that there are differences in individuals’ 
biases toward the negative events in a situation. It has been assumed previously that most 
individuals have a tendency to focus more on bad events than good events in the situation 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). The current research, however, argues that although all 
individuals may focus to some extent on bad events, observers focus more on bad events 
and less on good events than targets do. Such patterns are consistent when good and bad 
events are considered orthogonal (Studies 1, 3, 5) or when good and bad events are 
considered opposite ends of a single spectrum (Study 4). Thus, a situational role (being 
an observer) appears to intensify what is commonly referred to as the negativity bias 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). Such an explanation offers a greater understanding regarding 
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when individuals may have positive or negative perceptions of a situation by suggesting 
one factor that influences individuals’ focus on negative and positive events. 
 
Role Differences and Cooperative Behavior 
 The current research also contributes to the management literature in two ways. 
First, this work recognizes the importance of situational roles in groups such as the 
organization. Formal roles are an important aspect of effective group and organizational 
functioning (e.g., Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). But informal roles are also important, as 
such roles affect individual and group performance (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & 
Blume, 2009). Furthermore, the temporary informal roles that a person adopts in a 
situation, specifically being a target or an observer, appear to affect a person’s subsequent 
responses toward those involved in the situation. Noting the importance of temporary 
roles that may change multiple times throughout a day demonstrates how such roles 
affect individuals’ perceptions and behaviors, highlighting the important part these roles 
may have in daily social interactions, including interactions in the workplace.  
Second, one reason individuals’ cooperative behavior may vary across situations 
is articulated in this research. Both targets and observers respond to others’ actions 
through cooperative behavior (e.g., Boles et al., 2000; Spencer & Rupp, 2009; Turillo et 
al., 2002). However, the possibility that role differences promote differences in 
cooperative behavior has generally been ignored in previous research. Despite this, 
differences in perceptions across these roles have been acknowledged (Ross & Nisbett, 
1991), and other situational factors have been shown to affect cooperative behavior (De 
Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006). The current work 
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demonstrates that observers, compared with targets, are less willing to engage in 
cooperative behavior with those who initiate the situation. Thus, this work illuminates the 
differences between targets’ and observers’ cooperative behavior, supporting the idea that 
a small situational difference can drastically change individuals’ willingness to cooperate 
with others.  
 The context of ambivalent situations created in each study also has important 
theoretical implications. The studies presented here asked participants to recall or 
experience ambivalent situations through recall tasks, allocation games, trust-based 
scenarios, and performance feedback. Ambivalent situations appear to be common to the 
organizational setting, which allowed this research to demonstrate that the roles of target 
and observer may affect employee perceptions and behaviors. Ambivalent situations also 
presented an unclear valence of the situation. This context was key to isolating the effects 
of a person’s role on his or her perceptions of a situation’s valence from the effects of the 
valence of the situation itself. Indeed, when purely good or bad situations occur, 
individuals allow the situation’s valence to affect their perceptions of the situation’s 
valence (Weiner, 1985). Thus if targets’ and observers’ perceptions in a purely good or 
purely bad situation were compared, they would likely show little difference. The use of 
such contexts in previous research may be a reason the distinction between targets’ and 
observers’ perceptions of the situation’s valence were previously overlooked. By creating 
several different ambivalent situations, the robustness of targets’ and observers’ different 





Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite its theoretical contributions, this research has several limitations. The 
biggest limitations are the inconsistencies found in the empirical results across the five 
studies conducted. How the roles of target and observer, and subsequent perceptions, 
affected cooperative behavior led to the most inconsistent results. And although it seems 
that observers’ more negative perceptions, relative to targets’ perceptions, were due to the 
extent to which they focused on both good and bad events, there are limitations in some 
studies that could alternatively explain differences in focus on good or bad events across 
studies. Such limitations are addressed below.  
 
Inconsistent Results in Focus Across Studies 
Across all the studies that examined perceptions, observers had more negative 
perceptions than targets, but whether such perceptions were the result of observers 
focusing more on bad events or less on good events was inconsistent across studies. 
Consistent with the negativity bias, which suggests that all individuals focus to some 
extent on bad events and may vary more in the extent to which they attend to good events 
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001), Study 1 demonstrated that observers focused on good events 
in a situation less than targets did. But, in contrast to this finding, Study 5 demonstrated 
that targets and observers only differed in the extent to which they focused on bad events 
in the situation. Furthermore, Study 3 demonstrated that targets and observers varied in 
the extent to which they focused on good and bad events in the situation. And by 
changing the measurement used to assess individuals’ focus on good and bad events, 
Study 4 demonstrated that observers focused more on bad events, or less on good events, 
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in the situation. Two meta-analyses suggested that this was simply due to variation across 
studies and that observers’ and targets’ perceptions were a result of their focus on both 
good and bad events. However, there are other possible explanations for why such 
variability occurred.  
The observed differences in participants’ patterns of focus on good and bad events 
in Study 1 compared with the other studies may be attributed to the temporal nature of 
Study 1. When a person recalls a situation, he or she tends to focus more on positive than 
negative aspects of the situation, particularly when the situation personally affected the 
individual (Taylor, 1991). Because Study 1 used a recall task, it may be that the 
discrepancy between targets’ and observers’ discussion of good events in the situation 
was magnified relative to the other studies conducted. Another possibility, as discussed in 
Study 5, is that the sample used in Study 5 compared with the other studies may have 
affected the pattern of results. Specifically, a ceiling effect may have occurred in Study 5, 
which resulted in no variation between targets’ and observers’ focus on good events in 
the situation. Because of this effect, it is unclear how good events may have factored into 
observers’ perceptions relative to targets’ perceptions. Whether or not these factors 
actually affect what targets and observers focus on in a situation offers an opportunity to 
explore moderators beyond perspective taking that may affect the variation in targets’ and 
observers’ perceptions.  
 
Inconsistent Results in Cooperation Across Studies 
The biggest inconsistencies across studies were with regard to the types of 
behavior that resulted from individuals’ roles. In Study 2, observers actually engaged in 
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less cooperative behavior than targets, but reported that they would engage in similar 
cooperative behavior as targets. In Study 3, observers reported that they had more 
negative perceptions and, as a consequence, would be less willing to cooperate with the 
situation’s initiator compared with targets. In contrast, observers also had negative 
perceptions in Study 4, but such perceptions led to more cooperative behavior. A meta-
analysis assessing the effect size of individuals’ roles on their cooperative behavior 
suggested that other factors related to each specific study may explain the observed 
differences across studies. Outlined next are some of the possible explanations for why 
these inconsistencies may have occurred.  
At the end of Study 4, one possibility suggested was that performance feedback 
and allocations as outcomes are fundamentally different experiences and result in 
different behavioral outcomes. In Studies 2 and 3, the allocation outcome represented a 
gain-only situation. Furthermore, in Study 2 the gain was only small, and in Study 3 any 
gain was hypothetical. In contrast, the instructor’s feedback in Study 4 represented a 
large potential gain or loss for the participant; participants could receive more or less 
attention from the instructor or change their standing in the program depending on their 
responses to the feedback they received. Another difference is the nature of the 
relationships in the allocation games compared with the ballet class. In the allocation 
games, participants did not have an interpersonal relationship with one another and knew 
that they would interact with those in their group for a short time. In contrast, the dancers 
in the ballet study knew that they would have classes again with the instructor and that 
the instructor may eventually have influence over their career; thus the ongoing 
relationship that they would have with the instructor was likely salient and important to 
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dancers. The distinction between gains and losses, the reality of the outcomes, the 
outcome size, and the relationship between those involved in the situation may all affect 
how individuals behave in a given situation (Fischer et al., 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). 
Thus, one or all of these factors could have affected the relationship between how an 
individual perceived the situation and his or her subsequent response. Participants in 
Study 4, for example, may have considered their behavior much more carefully in 
response to the good or bad situations they encountered, as the consequences of such 
responses were real and not part of a game. This may have led participants to engage in 
different behaviors than they otherwise would, resulting in behavioral patterns that were 
opposite of those found in Studies 2 and 3.  
Many of the explanations discussed above—greater consequences, the possibility 
of losses as a result of an individual’s behavior, and ongoing and influential 
relationships—suggest that the performance feedback context from Study 4 may be more 
consistent with an organizational setting than the allocation context. For example, 
individuals in organizational settings often recognize that their behavior could impact 
their future in the organization or affect their relationship with another person. Despite 
such similarities, major differences between these contexts also exist. One difference 
between organizations and ballet classes is the developmental nature of feedback in ballet 
classes. Indeed, ballet dancers are known to see any feedback—including bad feedback—
as an indication that they have the potential for success (Bullock, 2015); such an 
assumption is not present in many organizational contexts. Thus, although ballet classes 
have many similarities to organizations in terms of the outcomes and relationships that 
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occur, how individuals perceive the positive and negative feedback that they receive may 
not be among such similarities.  
Another possible reason for the inconsistent results in Study 4 compared with the 
other studies has to do with the design of Study 4. Although in Study 4 participants were 
assigned to be either targets or observers, all participants received feedback during each 
class session. The instructor was purposely blind to each participant’s condition to ensure 
that no one taking the class received more or less attention than anyone else in the class. 
Because the distinction between targets and observers was less clear in Study 4 compared 
with the experimental studies, it may have affected participants’ behavioral responses to 
feedback that they experienced or observed.  
 
Inconsistent Results Across Cooperation Measures 
A related inconsistency across studies was regarding the results found between 
the actual and self-reported cooperation measures in Study 2 and the self-reported 
cooperation measures in Studies 2 and 3. In Study 2, observers actually cooperated less 
with the initiator of the situation than targets did, but their self-reports of cooperative 
behavior suggested that targets and observers were similarly willing to cooperate. In 
Study 3, observers reported that they felt less cooperative than targets through their 
greater focus on bad events. Although the results of the self-reported measure of 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate in Study 2 seem inconsistent with the results of the 
behavioral measure in Study 2 and the self-reported measure in Study 3, the nature of the 
study designs may offer insight into how the different results of these studies can be 
reconciled. In Study 2, participants engaged in a multiple round dictator game in which 
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they received or saw allocations made by the allocator. Participants saw that in every 
round the allocator gave the target at least a small portion of money. In Study 3, 
participants saw that the allocator in the game gave all or none of the money to the 
recipient, which was a much clearer distinction between good and bad events. Because 
the ambivalent situation in Study 2 was subtler than in Study 3, it may have been more 
difficult for observers to recognize their noncooperative behavior. In other words, 
observers’ cooperative behavior in Study 2 may have been suppressed compared with 
that of targets, resulting in observers reporting that their behavior was more cooperative 
than it actually was. In contrast, with the good and bad events clearly distinguished in 
Study 3, it may have been easier for observers to recognize their unwillingness to 
cooperate, which resulted in a difference in observers’ and targets’ self-reports of 
cooperation. 
Furthermore, given the evidence presented in Chapter 1 that individuals are 
motivated to maintain a positive image in their own eyes and in the eyes of others (e.g., 
Taylor & Brown, 1988), it is possible that all individuals were attempting to preserve 
their positive image by rating themselves more willing than they actually were to 
cooperate. This motivation may have resulted in an inaccurate reflection of participants’ 
actual willingness to cooperate.  Indeed, previous research has acknowledged that 
individuals have a tendency to self-enhance when they are given the opportunity to report 
their own behavior (Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Holtgraves, 2004; Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986). If participants perceived that cooperation was desired during the studies, 
individuals across both conditions may have wanted to rate themselves favorably on this 




Based on the above discussion, the most fruitful area for future research seems to 
be testing the boundary conditions of the proposed model. I have tested one boundary 
condition—perspective taking—and found that it attenuates the variation between 
targets’ and observers’ perceptions, encouraging less negative perceptions in observers. 
However, there are other moderators that potentially affect this relationship. One that has 
been suggested above is the temporal nature of the situation—whether the situation is 
occurring at the moment or has already occurred. Another potential moderator may 
include the types of relationships that the target, observer, and initiator of the situation 
have with one another. For example, if a target and observer are close friends, rather than 
casual acquaintances, there may be no differences between their perceptions because their 
own and the other person’s motivations are already closely aligned.  
The moderators of the relationship between individuals’ perceptions of a 
situation’s valence and their subsequent behavioral responses are also an important area 
for future research. One such moderator may be the context in which the situation is 
occurring. The hypotheses related to cooperation were supported in the allocation 
contexts outlined in Studies 2, 3, and 5, but not supported in the ballet context in Study 4. 
Such mixed results suggest that targets and observers may not respond in the same way 
across all situations they encounter in the organizational setting. While allocation games 
and ballet classes are very different, each context has some overlap with actual 
organizational settings. As discussed above, in both the ballet context and other 
organizational settings, individuals’ behaviors can impact their future with the 
organization and can have lasting effects on future relationships with individuals. Yet, all 
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feedback in a ballet class offers the opportunity for growth, which may not be the case of 
all bad events in the situation. Thus, the ballet context seems to demonstrate what occurs 
in an organization that supports a learning culture, in which employees see failures as 
opportunities to learn and are motivated to engage in behavior that enhances their own 
performance (Murphy & Dweck, 2010). Organizations that promote learning cultures 
encourage individuals to learn from mistakes, rather than respond defensively (Murphy & 
Dweck, 2010; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), and to seek out individuals who have a 
growth, rather than an incremental mindset (Chatman & Cha, 2003). Such a culture may 
reverse the hypothesized effect between negative perceptions and uncooperative 
behavior. 
Allocation games appear to be one context in which the hypothesized 
relationships are supported. Such contexts also have similarities to organizational 
contexts. For example, in both contexts, many of the bad events that individuals 
experience do not offer opportunities for further development, much like the offers that 
occur in allocation games. The allocation context used in Studies 2, 3, and 5 offers insight 
into the pattern of behavior that might be observed in negotiations contexts in the 
organization since both parties enter the negotiation with the expectation that they will 
gain something over what they can achieve on their own (Thompson et al., 2010). 
Although both the allocation and ballet contexts have limitations in their ability to fully 
predict what might occur in the organizational setting, such limitations demonstrate the 
complexity of the organizational setting and offer insight into the boundary conditions of 
the relationship between the valence of perceptions and cooperative responses. Each of 
these contexts should be further explored in future research to better understand how 
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individuals respond to different types of good and bad events. Further, since these 
contexts do not account for many occurrences in the organizational setting, it would be 
useful to explore the patterns of behavior across targets and observers in other 
organizationally-related contexts such as hiring, working in teams, hierarchies, and 
organizations with different types of cultures.  
Moving beyond cooperative behavior as a response also offers opportunities for 
future research. Indeed, the discussion supporting Proposition 2 suggested that targets 
and observers can respond in a variety of ways and that such responses can be directed at 
a larger group, others involved in the situation, or the situation’s initiator. Future research 
could extend the findings of this research to several types of responses such as trust, 
retribution, commitment, and satisfaction. Furthermore, research could examine 
individuals’ responses toward the larger group in which the situation occurs, offering 
further insight into how the roles of targets and observers affect group outcomes.  
Finally, one of the major contributions of this work is that it demonstrates another 
way in which targets’ and observers’ perceptions vary beyond the amount of detail that 
they recognize in the situation. Understanding why individuals’ perceptions vary in the 
proposed manner is important for future research. One potential explanation, focusing on 
the salience of individuals’ motivations in a situation, was outlined in Chapter 1. 
Specifically, Chapter 1 proposed that one factor that is different between targets and 
observers is the salience of their self and social motivations, which in turn affects their 
perceptions differently. Understanding how such motivations are affected by situational 
roles, and affect individuals’ perceptions, would offer insight into the differences 
between targets’ and observers’ perceptions. Furthermore, it is important for future work 
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to continue to expand the ways in which targets’ and observers’ perceptions vary and the 
underlying process, which will better illuminate why individuals behave differently when 
they experience the same situation.  
 
Practical Implications 
 Individuals adopt temporary roles in multiple situations every day. These 
situations often occur within an organizational setting, as many individuals spend much 
of their day at work. Thus, there are several practical implications of this research for 
organizations to consider. Most important, organizations and individuals in organizations 
should recognize that situational roles can affect how individuals perceive and respond to 
situations.  For example, in assigning tasks to his or her team, a project manager should 
be aware that while team members might easily comply with their assignments as the 
targets of the assignments, observers from another team may have negative responses to 
how the tasks were assigned. Such negative responses from observers may affect future 
cooperation across the teams. From this example, another implication of this research is 
that managers must consider how to include those who affect the final performance of the 
team. Indeed, including individuals in decision-making processes appears to result in 
positive outcomes for both individuals and the organization. This claim is consistent with 
work on job design, goal setting, and empowerment, which suggests that when 
individuals feel included in key aspects of the task or job, they experience positive 
outcomes such as higher satisfaction (Erez & Kanfer, 1983; Hackman & Lawler, 1971; 
Spreitzer, 1995; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001).  
The current research may also help organizations encourage more cooperation 
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among employees who are observers. Indeed, taking the perspective of the target appears 
to be an effective way to reduce the negative perceptions that observers have of a 
situation and has been previously implemented in the organizational setting (Galinsky & 
Mussweiler, 2001; Grant & Berry, 2011; Parker & Axtell, 2001). Thus, if organizations 
can recognize individuals’ distinct roles, they can then encourage greater cooperation 
from observers through encouraging them to take the perspective of targets.  
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this research was to understand better how targets’ and observers’ 
perceptions of the valence of a situation varies and how such perceptions affect 
subsequent cooperative behavior. This research demonstrated that 1) observers have more 
negative perceptions than targets do, 2) such perceptions affect subsequent cooperative 
responses toward the initiator of the situation, and 3) perspective taking can help 
attenuate an observer’s negative perceptions of a situation. Although groups and 
organizations may not be able to always control a person’s role as a target or an observer 
in a situation, knowing that this simple situational factor can affect an individual’s 
perceptions and subsequent responses is important. At the very least, recognizing the 
implications of the role that individuals adopt in a situation may offer insight into why 
they perceive a situation so negatively and refuse to cooperate and how to change such 










DICTATOR GAME – TARGET’S INSTRUCTIONS 
 
You are about to participate in a silent negotiation in which there will be no 
communication.  This negotiation will involve several rounds of "one-shot" 
offers.  Specific details on this negotiation are provided on the next page.  
 
(next page in survey) 
  
In this part of the exercise, you will be playing the role of the “recipient” in an ultimatum 
bargaining game.14 
  
To begin, the allocator, who is your partner in this game, will have the opportunity to 
allocate a pot of money between the two of you.  As the recipient, you will not be given 
the opportunity to reject this offer; rather, you will have to accept whatever offer is made 
to you. However, at any point during the game, you may be reassigned to act as the 
allocator in the game, at which point you will be allowed to determine how much money 
you and your partner each receive.  
  
The size of the pot in each round is: $ 1.50 
  
To make an offer, the allocator will first need to indicate the amount of money he or she 
plans to offer you.   The allocator can offer any amount between $0 and $ 1.50.  You may 
receive the amount of money that is offered to you.  
   
You are the only recipient in this game, however, other individuals will observe your 
game and the decisions made. Although there are other individuals involved in this game, 
they will never know your identity, as you will remain anonymous. 
  
On the next page, you will see the first offer made to you by the allocator.  
  
 
                                                
 






SUBJECTIVE VALUE INVENTORY ADAPTED MEASURE 
 
1. What kind of overall impression did your counterpart make on you? (1 = 
extremely negative, 4 = neither negative nor positive, 7 = extremely positive) 
2. Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart? (1 = not at all, 4 = 
moderately, 7 = perfectly) 
3. Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your 
counterpart? (1 = not at all, 4 = moderately, 7 = perfectly) 
4. To what extent would you be willing to work with the allocator from rounds 1-4 







TRUST GAME – OBSERVER’S INSTRUCTIONS 
 
In the exercise for this study, you will read about several rounds of a game between two 
players (Player A and Player B).  Here is how each round works: 
  
There is $6 at the start of each round. Player A will make 
the first decision. Player A can choose to: 
1) Take $6 
2) Pass $6 
  
If Player A chooses "Take $6", he/she will earn $6 and Player B will earn $0. 
  
If Player A chooses "Pass $6", the amount of money grows to $18, and Player B decides 
how much of the $18 to return to Player A. 
  
Player B can "Return $18", "Return $9", or "Return $0". 
  
If Player B chooses "Return $18", Player A earns $18 and Player B earns $0. 
  
If Player B chooses "Return $9", Player A earns $9 and Player B earns $9. 
  
If Player B chooses "Return $0", Player A earns $0 and Player B earns $18. 
  
In each round, both players are asked to indicate what they would do before they see the 
other person’s decision. Note that the game may actually end earlier once Player A’s 
choice is revealed, so Player B’s choice may not influence the outcome of the game. 
  
For example, if Player A chooses to "Take $6," then the choice of Player B is 
meaningless (as the game ends with Player A earning $6 and Player B earning $0). Only 
when Player A chooses to ''Pass $6" will the choice of Player B matter. Still, in each 
round both Player A and Player B will record their decisions before the other player’s 
decision is revealed. 
__ 
  
At the end of the game you will prepare to play the same game you just observed. You 




decision will not affect which role you are assigned to, rather after you make your 
decision you will be randomly assigned to act as Player A or Player B.  You will then 
play the game as outlined previously. 
   
You will now observe the decisions of the players across four rounds. Please keep track 
of the money each player earns during each round.  You will be asked to report the total 
amount of money that each player earned later in the survey.  This will be good practice 
for you, as you will have to keep track of the money you earn when you actually play the 
game.  
 
In the first four rounds of the game, here are the decisions of the players:  
 
Round 1:  
 Player A: Pass $6 
 Player B: Keep $18 
 
Round 2:  
Player A: Pass $6 
 Player B: Keep $18 
 
Round 3:  
Player A: Pass $6 
 Player B: Give $18 
 
Round 4:  
Player A: Pass $6 



























COGNITIVE ELABORATION ADAPTED MEASURE 
 
When thinking about the situation described above and those involved were you … 
… Attempting to analyze the issues addressed by the situation 
… Not very attentive to the situation 
… Deep in thought about the situation 
… Unconcerned with the suggestions given by the individual involved in the situation 
… Distracted by other thoughts not related to the situation 
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